Letter dated 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 47 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report on Eritrea of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
Letter dated 22 September 2015 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 47 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), we have the honour to transmit herewith the report on Eritrea of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

(Signed) Christophe Trajber
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea

(Signed) Nicholas Argeros
Finance expert

(Signed) Zeina Awad
Transport expert

(Signed) Jay Bahadur
Armed groups expert

(Signed) Bogdan Chetreanu
Finance expert

(Signed) Déirdre Clancy
Humanitarian expert

(Signed) James Smith
Regional expert
Summary

Throughout its mandate, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea kept the Government of Eritrea fully informed of its lines of investigation and sought to include its views and input in the report, based on their substantial value and as they related to the mandate. Its repeated requests notwithstanding, the Group was not permitted to visit Eritrea during its mandate and did not obtain the Government’s full cooperation, contrary to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014).

During the mandate, Eritrea forged a new strategic military relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that involved allowing the Arab coalition to use Eritrean land, airspace and territorial waters in its anti-Houthi military campaign in Yemen. The Monitoring Group understands that, as part of the arrangement, Eritrea has received compensation from the two countries, including monetary compensation and fuel supplies. Any compensation diverted directly or indirectly towards activities that threaten peace and security in the region or for the benefit of the Eritrean military would constitute a violation of resolution 1907 (2009). Moreover, the Group has received credible information that Eritrean soldiers are embedded with the United Arab Emirates contingent of the forces fighting on Yemeni soil. If confirmed, this would constitute a clear violation of that resolution.

The Monitoring Group investigated a consignment by the Red Sea Corporation aboard the Shaker 1. The vessel docked at the Eritrean port of Massawa in January 2015 after leaving Port Sudan with weapons en route to an arms exhibition in the United Arab Emirates. The Group has in the past documented the role of the Corporation in trafficking weapons from the eastern Sudan to Eritrea, as well as its practice of mislabelling containers in order to conceal their true content from detection. While the Group found no violation of the arms embargo, it did find inconsistencies in the information that it uncovered about the stop in Massawa and noted patterns consistent with the Corporation’s established modus operandi.

The Monitoring Group found no evidence that Eritrea was supporting Al-Shabaab. It did, however, find that Eritrea was continuing to support and harbour some regional armed groups, including a newly formed unified front of armed Ethiopian opposition groups, the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM) and the military leader of Ginbot Sebat.

TPDM remains the most significant armed Ethiopian group being trained, financed and hosted inside Eritrea. The Monitoring Group understands that a contingent of TPDM fighters is stationed in the western region of Eritrea, near the Sudanese border, as well as in and around Massawa. Moreover, TPDM has joined the newly formed unified front of armed Ethiopian opposition groups. In September 2015, it witnessed its highest-level defection to date when its Chair, Mola Asgedom, escaped to Ethiopia following political disagreements with the leader of the unified front. The Group is continuing to ascertain the significance of the defection.
The Monitoring Group understands that Eritrea continues to maintain an informal economy controlled by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) involving hard currency transactions through an obscure, non-transparent network of business entities that are owned by the State and managed by senior officials of the Government, PFDJ and the military, just as most companies in Eritrea.

The lack of financial transparency continues to create structural difficulties and limits the Monitoring Group’s ability to assess the country’s compliance with resolution 1907 (2009). The Group is especially concerned at the overall lack of public financial transparency at a time when international and multinational organizations are pledging monetary aid to the Government.

The Monitoring Group has received testimony from multiple sources in the Eritrean diaspora and host country authorities that the Government continues to impose extraterritorial taxation requirements on Eritrean citizens living abroad. It appears that citizens are now advised to submit payment directly to Asmara. As previously found, a refusal to pay the tax often results in a denial of the services offered at consulates and embassies.

The Monitoring Group notes that the Government continues to maintain a complete lack of transparency with regard to mining revenue. The Group has closely monitored a court case filed in Canada over the alleged use of forced labour and inhumane treatment at the Bisha mine in Eritrea, which is operated by a Canadian company, Nevsun Resources Limited. According to the complaint, the Government forced conscripts to provide labour to the following government contractors: Segen, owned by PFDJ, and Mereb, owned by the Eritrean military. The Group found that Nevsun had hired Segen and Mereb to provide labour in an arrangement where they paid workers far less than the amount that they were charging Nevsun for the labour. It is suspected that the difference is being withheld by Segen and Mereb, and thus, by extension, by the Eritrean military and Government.

The Monitoring Group continues to note the lack of any progress on article 3, concerning prisoners of war, of the Comprehensive Agreement, signed on 6 June 2010 by Djibouti and Eritrea under the auspices of the Government of Qatar. During its mandate, the Group was informed of an incident involving the kidnapping of a soldier from Djibouti in the territory separating Djibouti and Eritrea in July 2014. Moreover, the Government of Djibouti provided the Group with a list of names of Eritrean prisoners that it claims to be holding, as well as prisoners of war from Djibouti whom it claims are missing in action as a result of the border clashes of 10 to 12 June 2008 between the two countries. The Government of Eritrea has yet to acknowledge that it holds combatants from Djibouti or to provide any information on their current condition.
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I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, as set out in paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), was extended by the Council in paragraph 46 of Council resolution 2182 (2014). Additional tasks were assigned to the Group under resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2142 (2014).

2. Pursuant to paragraph 13 (l) of resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group provided the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea with a midterm briefing on 8 April 2015. The Group also submitted monthly progress reports to the Committee throughout its mandate.

3. In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group travelled to Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Lebanon, Malaysia, Norway, Qatar, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.

4. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Christophe Trajber (Coordinator and maritime transport), Nicholas Argeros (finance), Zeina Awad (transport), Jay Bahadur (armed groups), Déirdre Clancy (humanitarian affairs), Bogdan Chetreanu (finance) and James Smith (regional).

B. Methodology

5. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the previous reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the mandate under review. The Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports (most recently, S/2014/727 and S/2013/440). The methodology used for the present report was as follows:

   (a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where possible;

   (b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events, where possible;

   (c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;

   (d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with regard to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources;

   (e) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary evidence in support of the information collected.

6. The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access to those involved in potential violations by way of individuals who have direct knowledge or who know people who have direct knowledge about details of potential violations. In its investigations, the Group conducted more than 150 meetings with a broad range of sources, including Member States, non-governmental organizations,
the Eritrean diaspora and former officials of the Government of Eritrea. In particular, the Group received confidential briefings from Member States and regional organizations, and the types of individuals whom it met included diplomats, former military personnel and officials, members of armed groups and businesspeople involved in the natural resources sector, the import/export sector and traders, especially in locations in which Eritrean business interests are predominant. From those various sources, the Group received witness testimony and confidential and open-source documentation. The Group assessed hundreds of documents to determine their relevance to the present report. Ultimately, the Group sought information from the Government of Eritrea through direct meetings and official correspondence (as described in sect. C below).

7. In conformity with past guidance provided by the Committee, the Monitoring Group endeavoured to include as much of the testimony and evidence as possible in the present report. However, General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265, necessitated the use of annexes, preventing much of the substance from being translated.

C. Engagement with the Government

8. The Security Council, in its resolution 2182 (2014), underlined the importance of engagement between the Government and the Monitoring Group and underscored its expectation that that cooperation would deepen during the Group’s current mandate, including through regular visits to Eritrea by the Group. As such, the Group sought to continue its engagement with the Government, building on a series of meetings that it held with Eritrean officials during its previous mandate, including in Paris on 8 December 2013, in Cairo on 14 February 2014 and in New York via videoconference on 28 July 2014.

9. On 12 February 2015, the Monitoring Group held a courtesy meeting in New York with the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations, Girma Asmerom Tesfay, in the presence of officials of the Secretariat. During the meeting, the Group introduced the newest member of the Eritrea team and discussed modalities and a way forward for constructive engagement during its mandate. The Group also restated its long-standing request to visit Asmara and meet the relevant authorities there.

10. On 31 March 2015, the Chair of the Committee, Rafael Dario Ramirez Carreño, presided over a videoconference between the Monitoring Group and the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations (see S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.20). The purpose of the meeting was for the Group to inform the Government of its preliminary lines of inquiry and to enable the Permanent Representative to respond ahead of the Group’s midterm briefing to the Committee, which was delivered on 8 April 2015.

11. The Permanent Representative confirmed that he would respond to the substantive questions and allegations in writing and requested his response to be reflected in the midterm briefing. In addition, the Chair informed the Monitoring Group that he planned to travel to the Horn of Africa region, including to Eritrea, to meet with officials there as part of his work as Chair. Moreover, the Coordinator of the Group restated the Group’s readiness to visit Asmara.
12. In a note verbale dated 1 April 2015, the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations transmitted the Government’s response, as presented during the videoconference. It stated that the sanctions on Eritrea were politically motivated and raised the issue of the new geopolitical climate created by the conflict in Yemen, stating that “extremism and terrorism is spreading in the region and globally” and reiterating the Government’s demand that the Security Council lift the arms embargo on Eritrea so that the country “can effectively and efficiently fight all types of extremism and terrorism” (see annex 1.1 and S/AC.29/2015/COMM.22).

13. With regard to the 2 per cent rehabilitation and recovery tax, the Government stated that it “has never used ‘coercive methods or intimidation’ to collect the tax”, which, it is claimed, is collected transparently. The Government also stated that, “since the SEMG has itself ascertained that it ‘has found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab’, there was no justification for the SEMG to continue requesting Eritrea to provide information on [natural resources]”. Lastly, the Government reiterated its refusal to discuss the Djibouti process.

14. The Monitoring Group found that the response did not fully address the substantive questions that it had raised during the videoconference. Consequently, on 2 April 2015, the Group wrote to the Permanent Representative of Eritrea, outlining the preliminary findings that it had presented during the videoconference and highlighting pending and additional information requests.

15. On 8 April 2015, the Monitoring Group presented its midterm briefing to the Committee. The points raised during the briefing were consistent with the content of the videoconference of 31 March and the letter of 2 April.

16. On 17 April 2015, the Permanent Representative of Eritrea wrote to the Chair of the Committee, questioning the purpose of the Monitoring Group’s letter dated 2 April and stating that he had already answered the Group’s questions during the videoconference on 31 March and in the written submission of 1 April, which was submitted as an enclosure to his letter (see annex 1.3 and S/AC.29/2015/COMM.24). Upon reviewing the letter, the Group found that it did not fully address the following information requests that the Group had made to the Government and the substantive issues that it had raised:

(a) Details on the content of the container commissioned by the Red Sea Corporation aboard the Shaker 1;

(b) Information about the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM), including the sources of its weapons, the location of its training camps and details on how it evolved into a paramilitary force;

(c) Information about combatants from Djibouti missing in action;

(d) Documentation showing that revenue from the diaspora tax and from mining was not being diverted into activities that violated resolution 1907 (2009).

17. On 21 August 2015, a second meeting between the Monitoring Group and the Permanent Representative of Eritrea was organized via videoconference under the auspices of the Chair of the Committee, represented by the Deputy Political Coordinator of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations, Alfredo Fernando Toro-Carnevali. Representatives of the Committee’s secretariat were also present. In advance of completing the present report, the Group presented its findings in their entirety and sought the views of the Government with the goal of
incorporating those views and documentary evidence provided by the Government into the report, based on the information’s substantial value as the information related to the Group’s mandate. The Permanent Representative stated that issues between Eritrea and Ethiopia were not part of the Group’s mandate. He further underlined that the sanctions on Eritrea had been imposed in connection with the border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti and allegations that Eritrea was supporting Al-Shabaab and not in connection with the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. He stated that Eritrea had not violated the arms embargo.

18. The Monitoring Group followed up with a letter that it addressed to the Permanent Representative on 25 August 2015 in which it outlined the findings that it had presented during the videoconference and requested Eritrea to respond to queries in relation to the Group’s investigations (see annex 1.4).

19. On 4 September 2015, the Permanent Representative transmitted the Government’s response to the queries submitted by the Monitoring Group (see annex 1.5). Again, the Group found that the response had not fully addressed the following information requests that it had made and the questions that it had posed to the Government:

(a) Information about the National Security Office and its role in supporting regional armed groups;

(b) Details on the content of the container commissioned by the Red Sea Corporation aboard the Shaker 1;

(c) Clarification on the newly formed unified Ethiopian armed opposition front;

(d) Clarification on the relationship between Eritrea and the military leader of Ginbot Sebat, Berhanu Negu;

(e) Information about TPDM and the role of the then Chair, Mola Asgedom;

(f) Clarification of the relationship between a Djiboutian opposition group, the Front pour la restauration de l’unité et de la démocratie (FRUD), and Eritrea;

(g) Comment on the allegation of Eritrean military involvement in the conflict in Yemen, including the nature of potential compensation received and clarification on the nature of relationship of Eritrea with the Houthi rebel movement;

(h) Information about combatants from Djibouti missing in action;

(i) Official documentation outlining procedures and regulations regarding the enforcement of the proclamation implementing the recovery and rehabilitation tax, specifically in relation to the collection of the tax from Eritreans living abroad;

(j) Budgetary documents to paint a picture of the revenue and expenditure of the Government;

(k) Detailed information on the nature of the commercial relationship between Eritrea, Nevsun and the following parties: Segen, Mereb, the Eritrean military and the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ);

(l) A copy of the agreement or agreements between the Government, Nevsun and the aforementioned State-owned companies;
(m) A copy of any agreement and/or contract, or production-sharing agreement, between Nevsun and State-owned companies or companies affiliated with the military and PFDJ, including other partners that participate in the construction and operation of the Bisha mine;

(n) Detailed breakdown of all expenses accrued from hiring labour, including conscripts;

(o) Explanation of how the costs are being met and by whom;

(p) Detailed transactional records of financial flows between Nevsun, Segen, Mereb and the military.

20. For ease of reference, the Monitoring Group has included the exchanges with the Government of Eritrea in their entirety in annex 1. Its efforts and repeated requests to visit Asmara notwithstanding, the Group was not permitted to enter Eritrea during the mandate under review and did not obtain the Government’s full cooperation, contrary to resolution 2182 (2014).

II. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo

21. The Monitoring Group investigated allegations of violations of the two-way arms embargo on Eritrea, as imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 1907 (2009). The Group received credible and persuasive testimony from multiple sources and independent reports indicating that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have established a military presence in Eritrea as part of the military campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen and may be offering Eritrea compensation for allowing its territory and possibly its troops to be used as part of the Arab coalition-led war effort.

22. Also in the context of the arms embargo, the Monitoring Group investigated a consignment by the Red Sea Corporation aboard the Shaker 1. The vessel docked at the Eritrean port of Massawa in January 2015 after leaving Port Sudan with weapons en route to an arms exhibition in the United Arab Emirates. The Group has in the past documented the role of the Corporation in trafficking weapons from the eastern Sudan to Eritrea, as well as its practice of mislabelling containers in order to conceal their true content from detection.

A. Yemen

23. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1907 (2009), all Member States are to immediately take the measures necessary to prevent the sale or supply to Eritrea of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial and other assistance, related to the military activities or to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of those items, whether or not originating in their territories. Moreover, under paragraph 6, Eritrea is not to supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, any arms or related materiel, and all Member States are to prohibit the procurement of the items, training and assistance described in paragraph 5 of the resolution from Eritrea by their nationals.
24. The Monitoring Group received credible and persuasive testimony from multiple sources and independent reports indicating that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have established a military presence in Eritrea as part of the military campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Group also understands that Eritrea has received and may be continuing to receive compensation for allowing its territory and possibly its troops to be used as part of the Arab coalition-led war effort.

25. During its current mandate, the Monitoring Group noted that the strategic importance of Eritrea, at the crossroads between the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, had increased significantly in the light of the continuing conflict in neighbouring Yemen. Eritrea straddles the Bab al-Mandab strait, a narrow waterway that separates the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa and links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. At its narrowest point, the strait is only 29 km wide between Yemen on one side and Djibouti and Eritrea on the other. It is a key strategic channel for commerce and trade, with an estimated 4 per cent of global oil supply passing through it.\(^1\)

26. The strait hosts several islands, including the Hanish islands located between southern Eritrea and the Yemeni province of Ta’izz (see map in annex 2). Yemen and Eritrea have in the past clashed over the islands, which Eritrea occupied after the two countries went to war in 1995. The Permanent Court of Arbitration eventually ruled, four years after the war had ended, that the two countries should have joint custody over them.\(^2\)

27. The strategic importance of the Hanish islands rose significantly when Houthi rebels fighting the President of Yemen, Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi Mansour, took control of the western port of Hudaydah in October 2014 and began expanding their presence into the southern province of Ta’izz on the Red Sea.\(^3\)

28. The Government of Eritrea has acknowledged the recent geopolitical shifts in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea region. During a videoconference between the Monitoring Group and Eritrean officials on 31 March 2015, the Permanent Representative of Eritrea challenged the arms embargo on Eritrea, saying that the regional insecurity caused by the armed conflict in Yemen was a reason to allow its lifting. He called upon the Group to take into account new regional developments and cautioned that the “Islamic State” could seek to take over Eritrean islands. He stressed that Eritrea had a “right to self-defence” and that the sanctions were “unjust and


unjustifiable”. In a letter to the Chair of the Committee dated 17 April 2015, he further stated:

The arms embargo against Eritrea must be seen in the context of the current regional security developments in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region … Extremism and terrorism is spreading in the region and globally. Yemen, whom Eritrea shares long border on the Red Sea, including Bab el-Mandab, and which is only 30 minutes flight, is regrettably in crisis … With 1200 km of coastline and more than 35 islands on the Red Sea, Eritrea is strategically located at a major international maritime route that connects Bab el-Mandab and the Suez Canal. Invariably, for the sake of regional and international peace and security, Eritrea must be supported, not restricted.

29. The Monitoring Group understands that it is against this geopolitical backdrop that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates approached Eritrea with the purpose of forging a new strategic relationship that involves using Eritrean land, airspace and territorial waters in order to advance their military campaign in Yemen. Multiple sources, including two with direct access to senior officials in Djibouti, told the Group that that strategic partnership had been triggered when the two Gulf countries failed to strike a deal with Djibouti. Unable to use the territory of Djibouti as part of their military campaign to counter Houthi expansion in Bab al-Mandab, the two Arab countries turned next door, to Eritrea.

30. Independent sources have informed the Monitoring Group that high-level delegations from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates visited the Hanish islands and met Eritrean officials. The Group was unable to obtain an exact date for the visit, but estimates that it was conducted in either March or April 2015. Moreover, the President of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, visited Saudi Arabia on 29 April and met King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud. Open sources, including from pro-Eritrean regime media, reported that the two concluded a security and military partnership agreement. The details of the partnership have not been disclosed and it

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4 Interview with a former Eritrean military official with active ties to the Eritrean military, 6 May 2015; interview with an Eritrean political analyst with high-level contacts in the Persian Gulf, 27 May 2015; meeting with a high-ranking diplomatic source from a country in the Horn of Africa, 26 May 2015; confidential briefing by high-level officials from countries in the Horn of Africa, 16 June 2015; confidential briefing by a European country to the Monitoring Group, July 2015.


6 Interview with a former Eritrean military official with active ties to the Eritrean military, 6 May 2015; interview with an Eritrean political analyst with high-level contacts in the Persian Gulf, 26 May 2015; meeting with two high-ranking diplomatic sources from countries in the Horn of Africa, 26 May 2015; telephone interview with a former United Arab Emirates-based Eritrean official, May 2015.

remained unclear at the time of the writing of the present report whether the President had agreed to all the terms put forward by Saudi Arabia. The Group understands, however, that, as part of the agreement, Eritrea was asked to allow the Hanish islands and the port of Assab to be used by the Gulf countries as part of their military campaign against the Houthis. The Group also understands that the United Arab Emirates has leased the port of Assab — which is 60 km away from the coast of Yemen — for 30 years. Moreover, it appears that Eritrea was asked to commit itself to banning the Houthis from operating in any part of its territory.  

31. The Monitoring Group also received credible corroborating information that, as part of the arrangement, Eritrea had received compensation, including monetary compensation and fuel supplies. Given the opaque nature of the country’s financial management, however, it is difficult to determine whether revenue has been diverted to maintain or benefit the Eritrean military and to finance activities that violate the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1907 (2009) and 2023 (2011). Moreover, as is explained in detail in the finance section of the present report, both the ruling PFDJ party and the military control the country’s financial flows. It is therefore extremely difficult to distinguish between the flows to the Government and those to the Eritrean military, especially in the context of military engagement.  

32. The Monitoring Group also heard unconfirmed claims, including from a former high-ranking Eritrean official with contacts in the Eritrean military and an Eritrean analyst with direct access to serving Eritrean ambassadors in the Middle East and Africa, that some 400 Eritrean soldiers were embedded with the United Arab Emirates contingent of the forces fighting on Yemeni soil on behalf of the Arab coalition. If confirmed, this would constitute a violation of paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1907 (2009).  

33. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were reportedly concerned by some Houthi activities inside Eritrea. The Monitoring Group has received consistent information from a range of sources over the course of multiple mandates that the Government has had a history of allowing the Houthi rebel movement to use its territory to pursue military activities. While the Group has seen no specific evidence to support the claims, it received from the Government of Djibouti a copy of a confidential diplomatic note dated 14 April 2015 from a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the Government stating that, in January 2015, a meeting had been conducted in Assab between a member of an armed opposition group from Djibouti and three Yemeni individuals described as agents of

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8 Telephone interview with a former Eritrean military official with active ties to the Eritrean military, 21 August 2015; interview with an Eritrean political analyst with high-level contacts in the Persian Gulf, 26 May 2015; meeting with two high-ranking diplomatic sources in the Horn of Africa, 26 May 2015; confidential briefing by officials from countries in the Horn of Africa, 16 June 2015; interview with a former high-ranking Eritrean official, 3 May 2015.

9 Confidential information provided by a non-African Member State, July 2015; interview with an Eritrean political analyst with high-level contacts in the Persian Gulf, 18 August 2015; telephone call with a former high-ranking Eritrean official, 22 August 2015; telephone call with a leading Eritrean journalist based in Europe with strong contacts in the region, 4 August 2015.

10 Telephone call with a former high-ranking Eritrean official with active ties to the Eritrean military, 22 August 2015; interview with an Eritrean political analyst with high-level contacts in the Middle East and Africa, 18 August 2015. This was substantiated by information received by a credible development source in direct contact with Eritrean officials and shared with the Monitoring Group on a highly confidential basis.
the Houthis. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the arms requirements of the opposition group with the Houthi agents.

**Conclusion**

34. The Monitoring Group believes that Eritrea’s making available to third countries its land, territorial waters and airspace to conduct military operations in another country does not in and of itself constitute a violation of resolution 1907 (2009). The Group also received corroborating testimony from multiple sources that Eritrea has received and may be continuing to receive compensation in exchange for allowing its land, territorial waters and airspace to be used, and possibly its troops to be deployed, as part of the Arab coalition-led war effort. Any compensation diverted directly or indirectly towards activities that threaten peace and security in the region or for the benefit of the Eritrean military would constitute a violation of resolution 1907 (2009).

35. Moreover, if the credible claims received by the Monitoring Group that Eritrean soldiers are indeed participating in the war effort under the leadership of the Arab coalition were confirmed, it would constitute a clear violation of resolution 1907 (2009).

36. The Monitoring Group presented its initial findings to the Permanent Representative of Eritrea during the videoconference held on 21 August and in an official letter that it sent to him on 24 August 2015. During the videoconference, he denied that Eritrean soldiers were fighting in Yemen on the side of the coalition. On 27 August, the Group wrote to the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates inquiring about the details of the compensation that Eritrea might be receiving in exchange for providing access to its territory and possibly its troops, and the role of Eritrean soldiers, if any, in the military engagement in Yemen. The Group received no response (see S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.88 and S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.89).

**B. Shaker 1**

37. In paragraph 5 of resolution 1907 (2009), the Security Council decided that Member States were to take the measures necessary to prevent the sale or supply to Eritrea of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts related to military activities. As part of its mandate, the Group investigated a credible lead that it had received in January 2015, namely that the *Shaker 1*, a Togo-flagged cargo vessel listed under International Maritime Organization number 7929102, had docked at the Eritrean port of Massawa on 15 January 2015, loaded with weapons originating from the Sudan and bound for the annual International Defence Exhibition and Conference, a large-scale arms fair held annually in Abu Dhabi.\(^{11}\) Before arriving in Eritrea, the vessel had docked in Port Sudan, Sudan, on 12 January 2015, where it had discharged

\(^{11}\) This was confirmed by Wadi Al-Neel Clearing and Forwarding Co., the company operating the vessel, in a meeting between the Monitoring Group and representatives in May 2015 at the company’s office in Sharjah. The company’s website is www.wadineelgroup.com/inx.htm. The Group also saw a confidential note dated 11 February 2015 submitted to regional authorities by weapon inspectors with direct access to the vessel.
10 empty containers, two new trucks and 10 excavators, before taking on heavy weapons and military vehicles destined for the event.\textsuperscript{12}

38. The shipper of the weapons was the Military Industry Corporation of the Sudan, which is the commercial weapon manufacturing arm of the Ministry of Defence of the Sudan. The weaponry, as outlined in a certificate of origin signed by the Managing Director of the Military Industry Corporation dated 29 December 2014, was to be re-exported back to the Sudan after the exhibition. The Monitoring Group obtained the bill of lading provided by the Military Industry Corporation, which is included in annex 3.1 and which listed the following weapons:

(a) One self-propelled howitzer D-30 122 mm Kamaz;
(b) One howitzer D-30 122 mm;
(c) One BMP-2 armoured mortar vehicle;
(d) One 4 x 4 armoured personnel carrier;
(e) One military vehicle with 107 mm rocket launcher;
(f) One tactical vehicle FAC-19 500 x 182 x 172;
(g) One tactical vehicle SOC-14 500 x 200 x 198.

39. The Monitoring Group decided to investigate the case when it obtained the manifest and bill of lading for the consignments from Wadi Al-Neel Clearing and Forwarding Co., the United Arab Emirates-based operators of the \textit{Shaker 1}. The Group noted that the Red Sea Corporation was one of three Eritrean consignees. In previous reports, the Group has consistently identified the Corporation as the primary procurement vehicle for the Government of Eritrea to import a range of commodities, from basic staples and heavy machinery to weaponry, in violation of the arms embargo. In its 2014 report, the Group established that the route linking the eastern Sudan to western Eritrea was a key route for weapon smuggling and showed that the manager of the Corporation in the Eritrean town of Teseney at the time was overseeing and facilitating arms trafficking. The Group also noted that the Corporation regularly omitted details about the content of its shipments and mislabelled weapon containers in order to hide their true contents (see S/2014/727, paras. 17-23).

40. In this case, the Monitoring Group noted that the Red Sea Corporation had not included details about the material being transported, with the paperwork obtained by the Group describing the consignment as an “agricultural refrigeration room and spare parts”. No information was provided on the nature or make of the items, unlike the other two consignees out of Massawa, which were described in full (see annex 3.3).

41. The Monitoring Group confirmed with the operators of the \textit{Shaker 1} that Massawa was indeed the first stop that the vessel had made after leaving Port Sudan. The Group found, however, that the vessel had recorded all its scheduled stops with the exception of Massawa, according to Lloyd’s Register, an organization that specializes in tracking vessel movements globally.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, the Group has received conflicting reports about the vessel’s activities while at anchor in

\textsuperscript{12} For more on the exhibition, see www.idexuae.ae.
\textsuperscript{13} The Monitoring Group also saw the Wadi Al-Neel Clearing and Forwarding Co. list of port calls for the \textit{Shaker 1}. The document listed Massawa as the vessel’s port of call on 15 January 2015, stating that the vessel discharged material and left on the same day.
Massawa. Weapon inspectors were granted access to the vessel while it was docked in Somaliland a week after it had left Eritrea. They interviewed the vessel’s captain, who told them that eight empty containers and two civilian vehicles had been discharged in Massawa. This is contrary to the paperwork obtained by the Group from staff of Wadi Al-Neel Clearing and Forwarding Co. showing that the Shaker 1 unloaded two civilian vehicles and eight full, not empty, containers.

42. The Monitoring Group has previously reported on the Shaker 1. In 2013, the Group found evidence that stockpiled vehicles intended for dual military use had been loaded on to the vessel under the instructions of Eritrean officials in the port of Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates, and the cargo shipped to Massawa (see S/2013/440, annexes 12 and 13).

Conclusion

43. While the Group has been unable to obtain specific evidence of a violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 1907 (2009), it is also unable to rule conclusively and decisively on potential violations because of the multiple inconsistencies and established patterns documented in the case. The Group reiterates its request to the Government of Eritrea to cooperate in order for the Group to be able to reach a definitive conclusion. The Group asked the Government to provide more information on the content of the Red Sea Corporation consignment in letters dated 2 April and 24 August 2015. In both instances, the Government provided none of the requested information.

III. Support for armed groups in the region

44. Pursuant to resolutions 1907 (2009) and 2023 (2011), in which the Security Council prohibited Eritrea from supporting armed opposition groups that aimed to destabilize the region, including harbouring, financing, facilitating, supporting, organizing, training or inciting individuals or groups to perpetrate acts of violence in the region, the Monitoring Group investigated whether Eritrea was arming, training or equipping regional armed groups and their members, including Al-Shabaab.

45. The Monitoring Group found no evidence that Eritrea was supporting Al-Shabaab. It did, however, find that Eritrea was continuing to support and harbour some regional armed groups, including a newly formed unified front of armed Ethiopian opposition groups, TPDM and the military leader of Ginbot Sebat. It is difficult to ascertain the exact level and nature of Eritrean support for specific groups in the light of the lack of cooperation and transparency with the Group and, at times, the conflicting information regarding specific Eritrean-backed armed groups that the Group has received.

46. The Monitoring Group understands that Brigadier General Abraha Kassa, a long-time associate of the President, has replaced Colonel Fitsum Yishak as the person responsible for directing and overseeing foreign-armed opposition groups

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14 Confidential note submitted to regional authorities on 11 February 2015 and shared with the Monitoring Group.
that are funded, trained and armed by Eritrea. Along with Colonel Simon Ghebredengel, Brigadier General Kassa oversees the National Security Office, which was described as “the foundation of the Eritrean regime” in a confidential European Union member State briefing shared with the Group. According to the briefing, the Office has many functions, including overseeing and supplying foreign armed groups. The commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea has also identified Brigadier General Kassa as the head of the Office (see A/HRC/29/CRP.1, para. 275).

47. The Monitoring Group investigated information and documents that it received about varying degrees of support being provided to the following regional armed groups: a newly formed unified front of armed Ethiopian opposition groups, TPDM, Ginbot Sebat and FRUD. In September 2015, TPDM witnessed its highest-level defection to date when its Chair, Mola Asgedom, escaped to Ethiopia through the Sudan following disagreements with the military leader of Ginbot Sebat and Chair of the newly formed unified front, Berhanu Nega. The Group is continuing to ascertain the significance of the defection.

A. Newly formed unified front

48. The Monitoring Group understands that the Government of Eritrea facilitated and supported a move to unite a disparate group of armed Ethiopian opposition groups ahead of the Ethiopian general election that was held on 24 May 2015. The Group also received reports that a conference bringing together a number of Ethiopian opposition groups was held in western Eritrea. During the meeting, the groups, which included TPDM, the Patriotic Front, Ginbot Sebat and Arbegnoch, agreed to unify politically and militarily.

49. The level of success and internal cohesion of the newly formed group is unclear, although Mr. Asdegom’s defection suggests that there are internal rifts
among its top leadership. The Monitoring Group noted a report from the Associated Press in July 2015 that the Ethiopian police had killed 30 armed individuals attempting to enter Ethiopia illegally from Eritrea via the western part of the Tigray region.\(^{19}\) The Government of Ethiopia said in a briefing on 18 August that the attackers came from two members of the newly formed front: Ginbot Sebat and the Patriotic Front. The Group was unable to confirm the exact details of the incident, including which groups were behind the attack and the actual size and fighting capacity of the armed cell that conducted the attack.

B. Tigray People’s Democratic Movement

50. As at the time of preparation of the present report, the Monitoring Group understood that TPDM remained the most significant Ethiopian opposition group being trained, financed and hosted inside Eritrea.\(^{20}\) The Group has previously reported extensively on the continued support by Eritrea for TPDM in violation of paragraph 15 (b) of resolution 1907 (2009) (see S/2014/727 and S/2012/545).

51. TPDM, also known by its Tigrinya acronym “Demhit”, is an armed Ethiopian opposition group founded in 2001 by dissidents from the Ethiopian ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. TPDM says on its website (http://demhitonline.blogspot.com.tr/p/aim.html) that its aim is “to establish a popular democratic government of Ethiopia where the rights of nation and nationality are respected”. In 2014, the Group found that TPDM was being trained on Harena, an island in the Red Sea off the eastern coast of Eritrea, as well as in smaller military training outposts close to the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Moreover, in 2014, the Group reported that TPDM had become the most important Ethiopian opposition group inside Eritrea, with a dual function as an Ethiopian armed opposition group and a protector of the current regime. Its fighters, who hail from the same ethnic group as the President, are seen to be personally loyal to him. The support of Eritrea for TPDM appears to be more sustained and organized than its support for other Ethiopian armed groups (see S/2014/727).

52. In its report of June 2015, the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea noted the presence of TPDM in Eritrea and reported its role in round-ups against Eritrean citizens who had failed to report to their national military (A/HRC/29/CRP.1, para. 1213). The findings were echoed by Europe-based activists in contact with Eritreans inside Eritrea who told the Group that TPDM foreign fighters were involved in sweeps to round up people for conscription as recently as February 2015.\(^{21}\)

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20 Interview with a former Eritrean military official with active contacts in Eritrea, 6 May 2015; interview with a leading Ethiopian journalist with strong contacts in the region, 22 January 2015; interview with an international non-governmental organization researcher with expertise in the Horn of Africa, 17 March 2015; interview with a former high-ranking Eritrean official, 3 May 2015; online interview with a Europe-based writer and former members of the British Labour Party with links to the “Freedom Friday” movement, 13 March 2015.

21 Online interview with a Europe-based writer and former politician with links to Eritrea-based activists, 13 March 2015; meeting with a Europe-based journalist and human rights activist, 7 May 2015.
The Monitoring Group interviewed a former senior journalist and activist with TPDM who presented a TPDM current affairs television show out of Asmara. He defected to Ethiopia in March 2015 after nine years with TPDM. He told the Group that Mola Asgedom chaired TPDM.

He also claimed that TPDM ran five main cells at the following locations: Asmara; Harena-Jebel Hamid; Barentu and Adi K‘eshi; Massawa, with one contingent in Mai Atal and another in Yangus; and Dekemhare. The Monitoring Group has been unable to independently verify the claim, but has received corroborating testimony from multiple sources that a contingent of TPDM fighters is stationed in the western region of Eritrea, near the Sudanese border, and in and around Massawa.

In September 2015, the TPDM Chair, Mola Asgedom, defected to Ethiopia through the Sudan. Open media sources reported that he had crossed into the Sudan following a battle between his forces and the Eritrean military. The Monitoring Group understands from its sources that he defected with up to 800 of his soldiers following disagreements with Ethiopian opposition leaders operating under the newly formed unified front and, in particular, with the Ginbot Sebat military leader, Berhanu Nega, and that he had been working with the Government of Ethiopia in preparation for his defection for a year. Those accounts are supported by information available from open sources. According to a communiqué issued by the Government of Ethiopia, he arrived in Ethiopia on 12 September.

The defection came at a late stage in the Monitoring Group’s mandate and the Group is continuing to ascertain its significance. The overall consensus at the time of writing of the present report was that it was too early to fully assess its impact, especially in terms of its effect on the TPDM military strength and political significance.

The Monitoring Group twice requested the Government of Eritrea to clarify its relationship with TPDM during the videoconferences on 31 March and 21 August 2015. The Government did not respond to the substantive queries posed in both requests.

The journalist’s account about Mola Asgedom was confirmed in an interview with a former Eritrean military official with ties to the Eritrean military on 21 January 2015. Interview with a former high-ranking official, 3 May 2015; interview with a former Eritrean military official with ties to the Eritrean military, 21 January 2015 and 6 May 2015; interview with a former TPDM activist and broadcaster who spent nine years working as a journalist, May 2015.


Telephone conversations with a former high-ranking military official, 12 and 14 September 2015; interview with an Eritrean political analyst with high-level contacts in the Middle East, 12 September 2015; telephone conversation with a Europe-based Eritrean journalist with strong contacts in the region, 17 September 2015.

C. Ginbot Sebat

58. On 31 July 2015, the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations, Tekeda Alemu, wrote to the Chair of the Committee to inform him that the Ginbot Sebat military leader, Berhanu Nega, was in Eritrea and planning to launch attacks on Ethiopia. He included a report from pro-Eritrean open source media that stated that “Patriotic Ginbot”, a group believed to be an alliance between Ginbot Sebat and the Patriotic Front, was welcoming Mr. Nega and reiterating its support for an armed struggle against the Government of Ethiopia (see annex 4).

59. The Monitoring Group has in the past reported on the Eritrean history of supporting, harbouring and training Ginbot Sebat, in contravention of resolution 1907 (2009), including in its 2014 report (S/2014/727). During the Group’s mandate, Berhanu Nega left the United States, where he resides, for Eritrea, where he was appointed as Chair of the newly formed unified front of armed Ethiopian opposition groups. He has stated his continuing intention to overthrow the Government of Ethiopia. The Group received confidential information from two non-African Member States with direct knowledge of the case that, when Mr. Nega travelled to Asmara through Egypt, a senior presidential adviser, Yemane Gebreab, personally greeted him upon arrival.

D. Front pour la restauration de l’unité et de la démocratie

60. The Monitoring Group received a written communiqué from the Government of Djibouti on 22 June 2015 in which it stated that Eritrea continued to foment destabilizing activities, primarily in the northern part of Djibouti.

61. Djibouti singled out FRUD, an Afar rebel movement based in the north of Djibouti that advocates an armed struggle against the Government. The Monitoring Group has in the past reported on its activities and found that Eritrea was providing limited support for a splinter group, known as FRUD-Combattant, headed by Mohamed Kadd’ami. The group was active in small-scale military operations in the north of Djibouti (see S/2011/433).

62. Moreover, in a note verbale dated 29 June 2015, the Government of Djibouti transmitted to the Monitoring Group a comprehensive list of cross-border activities, including seven incidents that involved Eritrean-backed rebels from Djibouti. Of note,
some of the dates and incidents referred to have also been reported by open sources.\textsuperscript{31} The Government delivered the list to the Group at a late stage of its investigations. As such, the Group was unable to conclude its investigation and to verify the Government’s account of events.

63. The Monitoring Group put the claims to the Government of Eritrea on 21 August and in a subsequent letter dated 24 August 2015. In both instances, the Government did not comment.

Conclusion

64. The nature and extent of the support of Eritrea for regional armed groups varies. In the case of TPDM, the Monitoring Group finds Eritrea to be in violation of resolution 1907 (2009). In the case of Ginbot Sebat, the Group believes that Eritrea has violated paragraph 15 (d) of the resolution by harbouring and facilitating the work of Mr. Nega. In the light of the lack of evidence that Eritrea is supporting FRUD, the Group is unable to conclude whether Eritrea has violated the relevant resolutions.

IV. Financing in support of violations of resolution 1907 (2009)\textsuperscript{32}

A. General observations on structure and control of finances

65. The Monitoring Group has conducted investigations to determine whether revenue collected by the Government of Eritrea is diverted to finance violations of resolution 1907 (2009). For the past several years, the Group has reported extensively on the role of Eritrean officials and PFDJ in controlling and managing the country’s economy (see S/2014/727, paras. 87-101; S/2013/440, paras. 74-79; and S/2011/433, paras. 364-380).

66. During its mandate, the Monitoring Group has received consistent information from several former government officials and independent sources with direct knowledge of Eritrean finances that the Government of Eritrea continues to maintain a PFDJ-controlled informal economy involving hard currency transactions through a non-transparent network of business entities incorporated in several jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{33} The complete lack of financial transparency by the Government of Eritrea enables it to maintain a PFDJ-controlled informal economy. Senior officials


\textsuperscript{32} In paragraph 19 (b) of its resolution 1907 (2009), the Security Council stated that the Monitoring Group might consider any information relevant to implementation of paragraphs 16 and 17 of the resolution that should be brought to the attention of the Committee.

\textsuperscript{33} Multiple interviews were conducted throughout the mandate with former diplomats, former Eritrean officials and businesspeople with first-hand knowledge of the country’s finances and economy in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and North America. Multiple interviews were conducted in Addis Ababa with businesspeople connected to the Government of Eritrea in December 2014, on 29 and 30 January 2015 and from 27 to 30 March 2015.
within the Government and PFDJ continue to exert full economic control over revenue through a clandestine network of State-owned companies.\textsuperscript{33} The Group has documented extensively in its previous reports (S/2014/727 and S/2011/433) how Eritrea manages an offshore financial system controlled by elements of the Government and PFDJ to generate revenue streams.

67. As the Monitoring Group has repeatedly concluded, most companies in Eritrea are owned by the State and managed by senior officials of the Government, PFDJ and the military. The network of companies linked to PFDJ continues to be the driving force of the economy. The Government, through PFDJ and the military, has exclusive control of all economic activity, including the agriculture, trade and production sectors. In 2006, the Government passed Proclamation No. 159/2007 (Foreign Financed Special Investments Proclamation), which specifically limits foreign investment in financial services such as national wholesale trade, national retail trade and commission of agencies, but permits investment in other sectors.\textsuperscript{34} Meanwhile, in 2005, the Government suspended all private enterprises from conducting construction in the country and effectively awarded all public contracts to businesses controlled by PFDJ.

B. Lack of financial transparency

68. As outlined in paragraph 19 (b) of Security Council resolution 1907 (2009), the Monitoring Group is mandated to investigate whether revenue collected by the Government is diverted to finance activities that destabilize the region.

69. The Government maintained its stance of non-cooperation with the Monitoring Group, notwithstanding paragraph 12 of resolution 2023 (2011), in which it was called upon to show transparency in its public finances, including through cooperation with the Group. The lack of financial transparency and adequate controls has created structural ambiguities that severely hamper the ability of the Group to monitor the country’s compliance with resolutions 1907 (2009) and 2023 (2011). The Government continues not to disclose its budget appropriations and the country’s budget is not publicly available. In general, financial transparency also leads to financial accountability, which requires Governments to justify raising public resources and revenue and to explain how they are used. The standard practice by institutions and Governments alike to build and maintain budgets in order to demonstrate compliance with laws and communicate effectiveness is a practice not currently followed in Eritrea. The Group urges the Government to provide transparency in its public finances and budgetary appropriations in order for the Group to carry out its mandate fully.

70. During a meeting in Cairo on 15 February 2014, a senior political adviser to the President of Eritrea, Yemane Gebreab, agreed to provide the Monitoring Group with budgetary documents for the past three years demonstrating revenue and expenditure. Although the Group has consistently followed up on its request, most recently during videoconferences held between the Group and the Government on 31 March and 21 August 2015 (see annex 1.2), it has yet to receive such documentation.

\textsuperscript{34} See United States Department of State, “2012 investment climate statement on Eritrea” (June 2012). Available from \textbf{Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.}
71. The Monitoring Group is concerned at the overall lack of public financial transparency in Eritrea, especially at a time when international organizations are pledging aid to the Government. In the absence of financial transparency and financial reporting systems, it is challenging for any organization managing donor aid to ensure that the funds will be dispersed for the intended purposes. The donor community has an obligation to exercise sufficient oversight of the recipients of funds to ensure that the moneys are not used in potential violation of the sanctions regime.

72. In May 2015, the African Development Bank announced that it had signed an agreement with Eritrea to provide funding in the amount of $41.5 million for government-led projects on education and agriculture. According to the Minister of Information, the agreement was signed by the Minister of Finance, Berhane Habtemariam, and the Bank’s Regional Director, Gabriel Negatu. The Bank has a history of engagement with Eritrea. According to a recent report by the Bank, the Bank Group has financed 10 projects and a study valued at a cumulative commitment of some $143 million (UA 101 million), of which 33 per cent was in African Development Fund grants and the remainder in Fund loans. Furthermore, according to the Bank, the Government’s performance in implementing the Bank’s projects is progressing; however, some delays in implementing projects have been observed as a result of weak capacity and insufficient mastery of Bank rules and procedures.

73. The recent migrant crisis in Europe has accelerated calls for the European Union to tackle the issue of migration and to engage with the Government in order to implement development projects that dissuade Eritreans from leaving the country. According to the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 35,000 Eritreans arrived in Europe in 2014. The European Union is currently negotiating with the Government over a major aid package under the eleventh European Development Fund, covering the period from 2014-2020.

74. The European Development Fund was launched in 1959 as the main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and to overseas countries and territories. During the tenth Fund, covering the period 2008-2013, €122 million was allocated to Eritrea, but, in the light of the slow progress by the Government in absorbing the moneys, the amount was reduced to €56 million. According to the European Commission, four projects continue to be implemented in the following sectors under the tenth Fund: agriculture and food
security (€40 million), support to the community courts in Eritrea (€5.2 million), capacity-building for the public administration (€3.6 million) and technical cooperation (€10.2 million). In a statement delivered to the European Parliament, the European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, declared that aid was provided through projects and not given directly to the Government of the recipient country.

75. Against the backdrop of the European migrant crisis, several media reports alleged that the amount allocated to Eritrea under the current Fund was set to be tripled to €300 million. However, the Monitoring Group confirmed with the European authorities that negotiations regarding the operational details were in progress and that exact details and a final figure were unavailable at the time of writing of the present report.

76. From 2010 to 2012, several members of the European Parliament consistently questioned the European Commission’s decision to engage with the Government and provide it with a new aid package. In 2011, the Commission was asked to provide guarantees that the moneys allocated under the tenth Fund would be well spent and to provide the European Parliament with the details of how they would be dispersed. In a written response issued on 11 May 2011, the then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, stated, among other things, that the Commission prepared and executed reports on its budget according to financial management principles based on the best international good practices. In addition, the implementation of programmes was subject to several control mechanisms: financial external audits and midterm and financial evaluations carried out by external consultants were compulsory and foreseen in the financing agreements.

77. The Monitoring Group visited the headquarters of the European Commission and held meetings with various departments, including the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (Development Coordination East and Southern Africa). The Group received the highest assurances that the European institutions were implementing strict monitoring and auditing procedures to ensure that aid was provided only to the people and that no direct support was provided to the Government. Representatives told the Group that the bulk of the funds was to be distributed to support social and economic development, including good governance programmes.

39 Several meetings were held with European Union representatives from 31 May to 6 June 2015 in Brussels. The Monitoring Group met representatives of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, members of the European Parliament, representatives of the Office of the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa and external relations and foreign affairs representatives.

40 E-mail communication with the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (Development Coordination East and Southern Africa), 6 June 2015.

41 See “Eritrea: EU plans to provide Eritrea’s oppressive regime with new funding”, All Africa, 28 April 2015, available from http://allafrica.com/stories/201504281184.html. See also e-mail communication with representatives of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (Development Coordination East and Southern Africa), 6 June 2015.


43 For more information on the European Union auditing and financial procedures in distributing aid, see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/1079.

44 For more information on European Union regulatory and financial audit procedures, see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-funding-and-procedures/audit-and-control_en.
78. The Monitoring Group encourages international and regional institutions and organizations alike to ensure that they implement due diligence, monitoring and full oversight of the dispersal of large amounts of aid to Eritrea. There is a need to ensure that the funds are being accounted for and not being diverted to finance possible violations of resolution 1907 (2009). This is particularly important in the light of the context of the lack of financial and public financial management transparency by the Government.

C. Diaspora tax

79. In paragraphs 10 and 11 of resolution 2023 (2011), the Security Council condemned the use of a “diaspora tax” by the Government to destabilize the Horn of Africa region or for activities that violated relevant resolutions, including procuring arms and related materiel and supporting regional armed opposition groups or providing any services or financial transfers directly or indirectly to such groups. The Council also decided that Eritrea must cease using extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to collect taxes outside Eritrea from its nationals or from individuals of Eritrean descent.

80. The Monitoring Group has therefore conducted investigations to determine whether the Eritrean authorities are employing illegal and illicit means to collect taxes abroad. For the purposes of investigating the methods and assessing whether the Government was collecting the extraterritorial tax through illicit means, the Group met representatives of Member States and conducted more than 40 interviews with members of the Eritrean diaspora based in Europe, the Middle East, East Africa and North America.45

81. The Monitoring Group has reported extensively in its previous reports (S/2014/727, S/2013/440 and S/2012/545) on the proclamation to implement a 2 per cent recovery and rehabilitation tax that was enacted by the National Assembly in 1994. During its mandate, the Group has received testimony from multiple sources in the Eritrean diaspora and host country authorities that the Government continues to impose extraterritorial taxation requirements on Eritrean citizens living abroad. As reported previously, the Government has altered its methods of collecting the tax in the light of the adoption of resolutions 1907 (2009) and 2023 (2011) and increased public scrutiny. The Group has received testimony from multiple sources in the diaspora and Member States that Eritrean consulates and embassies abroad are now less confrontational and citizens are advised to submit payment directly to Asmara.46 Payment of the tax is a prerequisite for obtaining any government service from Eritrean consular or embassy officials. As previously found, a refusal to pay the tax often results in a denial of the services offered at consulates and embassies.

82. During a videoconference between the Monitoring Group and the Government on 31 March 2015, the Government reiterated its long-standing position that, in the event of failure to pay, citizens living abroad would face administrative challenges such as the denial of a business licence, land entitlement and other services. The

45 Given a fear of retribution by the Eritrean authorities or by other members of the Eritrean community living abroad, all sources requested anonymity.

46 The Monitoring Group conducted multiple interviews throughout its mandate with credible sources from the diaspora, businesspeople and former high-ranking government officials responsible for the country’s finances and procurement.
Group believes that such administrative penalties are an indirect way of using fear to control the process of collecting the tax. As stated in previous reports, the Government has created a culture of fear and intimidation among its citizens abroad. Most sources interviewed by the Group have expressed their constant fear of reporting any intimidation or coercion to the local authorities for fear of reprisal by networks of individuals sympathetic to the Government. The Group has interviewed multiple sources who have confirmed the existence of a network of sympathizers and a culture of intimidation that it has instilled in the diaspora. A Europe-based former government official who was a member of the Eritrean internal security forces spoke to the Group following his defection early in 2014. He informed the Group that he had been directly dispatched by the President’s Office to Italy to conduct and run operations to gather information on the Eritrean community living abroad through the Eritrean embassy in Italy. The existence of a clandestine network of informants has been further corroborated by testimony received by the Group from multiple Eritrean sources in diaspora communities in the Middle East, Africa and Western Europe.

83. The findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea, issued in June 2015, are consistent with the Monitoring Group’s own findings that local embassies and consulates have established a complex network of informants to collect information from and observe Eritreans living abroad. The Commission found that, “to conduct spying activities on their behalf, embassies often approach individuals from within the Eritrean communities abroad, in particular those who pay the 2 per cent Rehabilitation Tax as this is perceived as a form of support to the Government” (see A/HRC/29/CRP.1, para. 348).

84. The Monitoring Group has also obtained documentary evidence that the Government continues to raise funds for the Eritrean armed forces as part of its tax collection activities in the diaspora. A receipt issued to a private citizen based in the United Kingdom dated 2014 (see annex 5) shows a requirement by the citizen to make a payment of £200 to the Eritrean military.

85. Throughout its mandate, the Monitoring Group has consulted Member States in which the tax is being collected. The consensus is that those States are aware that the tax is being collected but have received insufficient evidence from Eritreans living in those countries that the Government of Eritrea is using extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to do so. Furthermore, they are advising the Eritrean community to report to local law enforcement authorities any acts by the Government to collect the tax that would violate paragraph 11 of resolution 2023 (2011). Similar to the Group, most States have identified challenges in ultimately convincing the Eritrean diaspora to officially and fully report to the local authorities any activities that constitute extortion, fraud or threats of violence to collect the tax, for fear of retribution against their families in Eritrea.

86. On 3 March 2015, a complaint was filed with the police in London against the embassy of Eritrea in the United Kingdom. The complainant alleged that he had been ordered by the embassy to pay the tax in order to receive consular services. During an interview with the Monitoring Group, he stated that he had visited the embassy several times because he was seeking to obtain a power of attorney for a family member in Eritrea in order to resolve pending financial and business issues involving the family’s business. On 1 May 2014, the Embassy had requested him to pay £350, an amount that he owed from 2009. At that time, he had been exempt
from paying the tax because he had presented documents attesting that he was attending post-secondary education in the United Kingdom. Officials had instructed him to submit the payment, in pounds, directly in Eritrea. He had had to find someone from the Eritrean community who would travel to Eritrea so that the tax could be paid in Asmara. Officials had also advised him that, unless the payment were received in full, his business affairs and the services requested from the embassy would not be completed. The Group understands that the police in London, specifically the parliamentary and diplomatic branch, examined the facts of the case to determine whether any laws of the United Kingdom or provisions of resolution 2023 (2011) had been violated. The Group has been informed that the police decided to take no further action following their assessment that no laws had been broken and because they had seen no evidence that warranted proposing to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that the resolution had been violated. The outcome of the case notwithstanding, it should be noted that the Group has in the past reported and documented that any renewals of licences or requests for power of attorney may be refused if a family member has not paid the tax.

87. In 2014, a former parliamentarian in the United Kingdom requested the Government of the United Kingdom to explain what measures were being taken regarding compliance with resolution 2023 (2011). In a written response, the former Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated that the United Kingdom supported the resolution and called upon Eritrea to cease using illicit means to collect the tax. Furthermore, she stated that, on 8 November 2013, officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the National Crime Agency and police in West Yorkshire had met members of the Eritrean diaspora to discuss the tax. At that meeting, Eritreans had been urged to report any use of coercion or other illicit means of collecting the tax to the police. In another written response, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated that the collection of taxes by Governments from their citizens overseas was not illegal under British law. However, the Government of the United Kingdom advised anyone required to pay such taxes to the Government of Eritrea who was subjected to actions that were in breach of resolution 2023 (2011) to report the matter to the police as the appropriate authority to investigate such allegations in the United Kingdom.

88. Early in June 2015, the parliament of Germany debated the issue of the tax as part of a larger discussion of the report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea. The parliament agreed that Germany should scrutinize the collection of the tax and stressed that the activity of collecting tax in ways prohibited under paragraph 11 of resolution 2023 (2011) should cease. The Federal Foreign Office in Berlin informed the Monitoring Group that the Government had taken no specific action regarding the collection of the tax in Germany because the act of collecting taxes was fully compliant with international and national law. In the past, the Office had communicated to the Eritrean side that it could not utilize its bank accounts or diplomatic or consular missions to collect taxes from its citizens

48 E-mail received from the Eritrea Desk of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 August 2015.
and transfer the revenue. In 2012, the embassy of Eritrea in Germany had advised the Office that it would cease using its accounts for those purposes.

89. During meetings between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea on 31 March and 21 August 2015, the Group requested specific information on the tax from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea, including a copy of the proclamation, official documentation outlining procedures and regulations regarding the enforcement of the proclamation and documentation showing that revenue collected annually through the tax was not being diverted to violate relevant Security Council resolutions. In its response dated 1 April 2015, the Government stated that the proclamation applied only to Eritrean citizens in the diaspora and did not include citizens of any other countries who were of Eritrean descent (see annex 1.1). Referring to paragraph 11 of resolution 2023 (2011), the Government stated that it had never used coercive methods or intimidation to collect the tax and that a failure to pay would result in administrative measures such as the denial of a business licence, land entitlement and other services. Furthermore, the Government reiterated its long-standing position that the collection of the tax was being conducted transparently and Eritreans residing abroad were neither charged nor convicted if they failed to pay. The Group assessed that the letter did not fully address all the substantive issues posed to the Government during the videoconference on 31 March. The Group reiterated its request for more specific information in a letter dated 2 April (see annex 1.2), to which the Government responded with a written communication dated 17 April. In the communication, the Government stated that the Permanent Mission had already answered all the questions in their entirety during the videoconference on 31 March and in the document transmitted to the Committee by means of a note verbale on 1 April. Lastly, during a videoconference on 21 August, the Permanent Representative of Eritrea denied that the tax was collected by means that violated resolution 2023 (2011). Furthermore, in a letter dated 4 September, the Government stated that all revenue from the tax was transferred to the Department of Treasury of the Ministry of Finance and to the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. According to the same letter, “in 2014, the annual revenue from 2% RRT was $11,172,758.33 dollars while what the government spent to support families of martyrs and war disabled veterans is over $27,000,000.00. Therefore the potential or probability of diverting RRT revenue to other activities is zero.” The Government also provided the Group with a copy of Proclamations Nos. 17/1991 and 67/1995 (see annex 1.5). It further explained that “Eritreans residing inside the country are obliged by law to pay taxes” and “Eritreans residing outside as well are obliged by law to pay taxes on the basis of Proclamations Nos. 17/1991 and 67/1995” (see ibid.).

V. Revenue from the mining sector

90. Taking note of paragraph 12 of resolution 2023 (2011), in which the Security Council expressed concern at the potential use of revenue from the Eritrean mining sector to support activities that would destabilize the Horn of Africa region and called upon Eritrea to show transparency in its public finances in order to demonstrate that the proceeds of those mining activities were not being used to violate relevant Council resolutions, the Monitoring Group investigated whether hard currency from mining revenue was being channelled through the Government’s financial structures for the purpose of supporting activities that would constitute a violation of resolutions 1907 (2009) and 2023 (2011).
91. The Monitoring Group has previously reported on the opacity of Eritrean financial management and lack of budget appropriations. The Group’s lack of critical access to information on the country’s financial architecture and financial flows has rendered the task of determining whether the mining sector is used as a financial resource to destabilize the Horn of Africa region a difficult one. Access is a prerequisite for the Group to render a fair and accurate assessment of whether any financing is being diverted to destabilize the region. There is a need for Eritrea to improve institutional transparency and the accountability of public financial management.

92. The complete lack of transparency is especially notable because mining is one of the most successful economic sectors in Eritrea and payments derived from mining activities are an important source of revenue for the Government. For example, in its response of 4 September 2015 to the Group’s letter, the Government stated that it had earned $200 million from its mining sector in 2014 (see annex 1.5, para. 27). The sector continues to expand and has largely contributed to the country’s recent economic growth. Currently, there are several multinational companies in Eritrea conducting exploration projects for potash, silver, copper and other minerals. The country is projected to have economic growth of 2.1 per cent in 2015, up from 1.3 per cent in 2013 and 2.0 per cent in 2014, as a result of improved economic activity and increased investment in the sector.\(^{50}\)

**Payments to the Government**

93. Nevsun, a Canadian company that operates the Bisha mine in Eritrea, is currently the only company that has swung into commercial production and continues to pay taxes, royalties and equity payments on its production to the Government. Data published by Nevsun show that the company has made significant payments to the Government since commercial operations began at the mine (see table).

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94. It is indicated in the table that, since 2011, Nevsun has paid close to $528 million in income taxes, royalties and other government remittances to the Government, $226 million to the Eritrean National Mining Corporation (ENAMCO), which owns 40 per cent of the mine, in the form of dividends and $299 million in local supply of goods and services. The Monitoring Group has not been provided with, nor has it been able to obtain, independently audited financial statements or records from Nevsun, the Government or ENAMCO to verify the above figures and, especially, payroll payments made for local services provided by Nevsun, its subcontractors and its local employees.

95. The Monitoring Group has sought to engage with Nevsun about its operations in Eritrea on numerous occasions, as part of its effort to verify that funds derived from mining are not appropriated and channelled through the Government’s financial structures for the purpose of supporting activities that would constitute a violation of resolution 1907 (2009). In a series of written responses to the Group during previous mandates (see S/2014/727, S/2013/440 and S/2012/545), Nevsun consistently cited confidentiality non-disclosure agreements when posed questions by the Group and repeatedly argued that the questions should be directed to the Government. The Group has repeatedly requested the Government to demonstrate financial transparency regarding revenue derived from mining, but the Government has consistently declined to provide substantive information.

96. It is in this context that the Group closely monitored a court case filed in Canada during its current mandate. On 20 November 2014, a lawsuit was filed at the Supreme Court of British Columbia against Nevsun over the alleged use of forced labour and inhumane treatment at the Bisha mine. According to the notice of civil
claim (Vancouver Registry No: S-148932), the Government extended the period of service for national service conscripts indefinitely in 2002 and forced conscripts to provide labour to various companies owned by either senior military officials or PFDJ, including Segen and Mereb. Segen is owned by PFDJ and Mereb by the Eritrean military. The plaintiffs alleged that the Eritrean subsidiary of Nevsun, Bisha Mining Share Company (BMSC), and its contractors used forced labour and workers were paid $10 per month for six days of work of up to 12 hours per day. Furthermore, the plaintiffs stated that Nevsun had engaged Segen, Mereb and the Eritrean military to build infrastructure and mine facilities at Bisha.

97. In the light of a possible nexus between the Eritrean natural resource sector and the Eritrean military, the Monitoring Group sought to gain greater clarity on the relationship between the sector and the armed forces. More specifically, the Group sought to understand and assess whether any financial flows from Nevsun through Segen, Mereb or any other State-owned entity operating at the mine were being channelled to the security and armed forces in a manner that violated the sanctions regime, as delineated by the Security Council in its resolutions 1907 (2009) and 2023 (2011).

98. The Bisha mine is located 150 km west of Asmara. It covers an area of some 46 km² and hosts zinc, copper and gold deposits. BMSC is an Eritrean company that was formed for the development and operation of the mine. Nevsun Resources, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Nevsun, is a 60 per cent shareholder in BMSC, while the remaining 40 per cent interest is held by ENAMCO. In a letter in response to the civil claim filed in Canada, Nevsun stated that BMSC had engaged Senet, of South Africa, to act as the main engineering, procurement and construction management contractor on the mine project. Then, Senet had engaged subcontractors, including Segen, an Eritrean civil engineering and construction company. In the same letter, Nevsun denied that Mereb had provided services to Segen, Senet or BMSC, as had been alleged.

99. Throughout its mandate, the Monitoring Group has received testimony from numerous sources, including from former senior Eritrean officials, that Senet, Segen and Mereb have used military conscripts to build and work on the mine. According to multiple credible sources, the State-owned contractors and subcontractors hired by Nevsun to provide labour are engaged in an informal pay structure, whereby the contractors and subcontractors charge a certain amount to Nevsun for each military conscript or local worker employed at the mine while they pay far lower wages to the military conscripts or local workers. Although the exact figures of labour agreements between Nevsun and the contractors remain unknown, currently the workers of contractors and subcontractors are being paid monthly wages of between 200 and 500 nakfa.51 The rest of the funds paid by Nevsun to Segen and Mereb are being held by the aforementioned contractors and thus, by extension, by the military and the Government because the contractors are effectively State-owned companies.

51 Several interviews were conducted with former senior Eritrean officials responsible for managing payments from 20 to 23 January 2015 and from 5 to 7 May 2015, including an interview with a former high-ranking official of the Government on 6 May 2015; an interview with a former senior-ranking officer with the Eritrean military on 8 May 2015; and an interview with a leading Eritrean journalist based in Europe with strong contacts in the region on 22 January 2015. In addition, testimony was provided throughout the mandate by several individuals familiar with the natural resource sector in Eritrea, including in meetings with non-governmental organizations.
100. Given that the Eritrean economy is controlled by the ruling PFDJ party and the military, it is extremely difficult to distinguish corporate structures and ownership between PFDJ-owned companies and the military. A former senior official within PFDJ stated that there was no difference between the Ministry of Defence and PFDJ when it came to money. In these types of contractual arrangement, the State-owned companies and, by extension, the Government are profiting by using a labour force comprising military conscripts at nearly zero cost to PFDJ and military-owned enterprises.

101. In the light of the lack of available documentation, coupled with the lack of cooperation by Eritrea and Nevsun, the Monitoring Group was unable to trace or account for the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the funds paid by Nevsun/BMSC to its contractors, and on the other, the amounts paid by the contractors to their labour force. The Group’s findings are, however, corroborated by those contained in the report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea, which found that conscripts did not receive additional remuneration for their work, even if the work was undertaken for the benefit of a foreign company. The commission stated that the funds dispersed by foreign companies to remunerate workers were being kept by the Government (see A/HRC/29/42). In a 2006 diplomatic cable by the United States, it was stated that Segen crushed private competitors and became the country’s largest construction company because its main advantage was its ability to contract labour force at nearly zero cost because most employees came from the national service.

102. On 19 May 2015, the Monitoring Group wrote to the Chief Executive Officer of Nevsun to ask whether financial flows from Nevsun through Segen and Mereb or any other contractors or subcontractors were being channelled to the Eritrean security and armed forces in a manner that violated the sanctions regime on the country. In a written response dated 15 June 2015, Nevsun stated that many issues were before the courts of British Columbia and the company was unable to respond to matters that might become part of the legal proceedings. As such, Nevsun refused to disclose any information requested by the Group. The Chief Executive Officer further stated that neither Nevsun nor BSMC had ever had any commercial arrangements with Mereb, the Eritrean military or PFDJ, nor was either privy to any commercial relationship that those parties might have. He also attached a letter as the company’s response to the civil claim in British Columbia that outlined its position on the allegations in the lawsuit and various other matters, including details of the relationships with Segen and ENAMCO.

103. During its mandate, the Group has reiterated its request to the Government to provide budgetary documents for the past three years to demonstrate revenue and expenditure, but has not yet received such material. The request had previously been agreed to by a senior political adviser to the President of Eritrea, Yemane Gebreab, in Cairo on 15 February 2014. During the current mandate, the Group reiterated its request during two videoconferences held on 31 March and 21 August 2015 with the Permanent Representative of Eritrea. The Government sent a note verbale dated 1 April 2015 to the Committee in which it addressed none of the substantive questions

52 Interview with a former senior-ranking Eritrean official with active ties to the Government in Eritrea, 5 May 2015.
posed. The enclosure to the note verbale stipulated that “the provisions of the UNSC resolution related to the mining sector are anchored on hypothetical and speculative assumptions of potential use of revenue” and that, “since the SEMG has itself ascertained that it has found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab, there is no justification for the SEMG to continue requesting Eritrea to provide information on this matter”. In the same document, the Government stated that the “country needs and uses every single penny from its revenue for the eradication of poverty” and that “our development partners can testify to this fact”. In the videoconference of 21 August, the Permanent Representative stated that revenue deriving from the Bisha mine operated by Nevsun was shared between the company and the Government but that Eritrea had not benefited from its mining sector because it was using revenue to create favourable conditions to attract further foreign direct investment in the sector. Furthermore, in a letter dated 4 September (see annex 1.5), the Government stated that:

The income the Eritrean Government gets from a single Bisha mining operation is insignificant when compared to the public and social expenditures such as education, health, and food security. For example, in 2014, the Government of Eritrea’s budget for education, health and food security alone was $328,894,753.00 which is more than the 200 million dollars the country earned from the mining sector.

VI. Acts that obstruct the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009)

104. The Monitoring Group has previously reported on acts that obstruct the implementation of Security Council resolution 1862 (2009) (see S/2014/727, S/2013/440 and S/2012/545). In paragraph 4 of its resolution 1907 (2009), the Council demanded that Eritrea should make available information pertaining to combatants from Djibouti missing in action since the border clashes of 10 to 12 June 2008 between the two countries, so that those concerned might ascertain the presence and condition of prisoners of war from Djibouti. The Council reiterated its grave concern about the border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti in resolution 2023 (2011) and called upon Eritrea to pursue with Djibouti the implementation of the Agreement of 6 June 2010 under the auspices of Qatar.

105. During its mandate, the Monitoring Group asked the Government of Eritrea about the military personnel from Djibouti reported missing in action, but, during videoconferences between the Group and the Permanent Representative of Eritrea on 31 March and 21 August 2015, the Government refused to discuss their fate, arguing that the issue was handled by the Qatari mediation team and could therefore be dealt with only through that channel. In a written communication to the Committee dated 17 April, Eritrea stated that “the issue of prisoners of war is part and parcel of the seven point comprehensive Agreement” and “there should not be cherry-picking approach and parallel initiatives must not be allowed or created”.

106. The Monitoring Group has noted an escalation in the rhetoric of Djibouti against Eritrea. In February 2015, the President of Djibouti, Ismaël Omar Guelleh, and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Desalegn, accused Eritrea of sabotaging regional stability, with the President claiming that Eritrea was
destabilizing peace and security in the countries of the region, including Djibouti. Eritrea refuted the allegations.  

107. The Group requested the Governments of Eritrea and Djibouti to provide further information about the missing soldiers. Djibouti cooperated, sharing with the Group the names, dates of birth and regiments of 18 male prisoners from Djibouti whom it claims were captured by Eritrea during the border clashes (see annex 6).

The individuals’ names are:

(a) Aden Ahmed, born 1953;
(b) Abdourahman Mahmoud Farah, born 1967;
(c) Hassan Elmi Had, born 1965;
(d) Hoch Ofleh Kochin, born 1967;
(e) Djama Ahmed Abrar, born 1972;
(f) Ahmed Eleyeh Yabeh, born 1971;
(g) Awaleh Eleyeh Yabeh, born 1973;
(h) Awaleh Abdi Omar, born 1973;
(i) Osman Mohamoud Ahmed, born 1964;
(j) Cheiko Borito Ali, born 1964;
(k) Kamil Youssef Ali born 1970;
(l) Kadir Soumboul Ali, born 1975;
(m) Mohamoud Hildid, born 1971;
(n) Meiraneh Alo Bock, born 1973;
(o) Houssein Ibrahim Houmed, born 1978;
(p) Abdillahi Daher Said, born 1965;
(q) Ali Gohari Gadito, born 1968;
(r) Mohamed Youssoud Oudoum, born 1966.

108. The Government of Djibouti also shared a list of Eritreans whom it claims to have taken into custody during the border clashes. The list, dated 24 August 2010, contains the names, regions of origin and ages at the time of compilation of 17 male Eritreans who are allegedly being held (see annex 6.2). The individuals are named as:

(a) Binyam Mengistab;
(b) Mohamed Mahmud Abrahim;
(c) Shishay Zejarayas Weldemariam;
(d) Kuwaja Halemikael Gebreslade;

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109. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti also provided the Monitoring Group with what it claims is a chronology of Eritrean acts to destabilize peace and security. The list contained the details of a kidnapping in the border area separating Djibouti and Eritrea. According to officials from Djibouti, Eritrean soldiers kidnapped a soldier from Djibouti, Ahmad Abdullah Kamil, on 25 July 2014 while he was being escorted in a Qatari vehicle in the border area. He was subsequently released on 15 September 2014 following Qatari mediation.\(^55\)

110. The Government of Qatar informed the Monitoring Group that it currently had an estimated 200 soldiers stationed along the border area between Eritrea and Djibouti. Officials responsible for mediating the process have been actively engaged to resolve the issue but have reported no progress to date. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Qatar, Khalid Bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah, held four meetings with high-ranking officials in both countries, including with the President of Eritrea on 3 March and 31 October 2014.\(^55\) The President also travelled to Doha in late August 2015, meeting the Amir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani.\(^56\)

111. It is the continuing assessment of the Monitoring Group that the refusal of Eritrea to engage or provide information on the issue of the prisoners of war from Djibouti constitutes an obstruction of resolution 1862 (2009) and that those responsible should be considered for targeted measures under resolution 1907 (2009).

\(^55\) Meeting with the Ambassador of Djibouti to Qatar, Moamin Hassan Berri, in Doha on 5 February 2015. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti also provided the Monitoring Group with a chronology of events that Djibouti claims involve Eritrea. The list contained the details of the alleged kidnapping in no-man’s-land on 25 July 2014.

VII. Obstruction of the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group

112. In paragraph 15 (e) of resolution 1907 (2009) and paragraph 3 of resolution 2111 (2013), the Security Council prohibited any obstruction of the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group and established such obstruction as a criterion for listing.

113. In paragraph 31 of resolution 2111 (2013), the Security Council underlined its expectation that the Government of Eritrea would facilitate the entry of the Monitoring Group to Eritrea without further delay. Furthermore, in paragraph 32, the Council urged all Member States to ensure cooperation with the Group and to ensure unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites that the Group deemed relevant to the execution of its mandate.

114. The Government has prevented the Monitoring Group from visiting Asmara during its current mandate and from pursuing its investigations inside Eritrea. The Group considers those responsible for such obstruction to be in violation of paragraph 15 (e) of resolution 1907 (2009) and paragraph 3 of resolution 2111 (2013).

VIII. Recommendations

Engagement with the Government of Eritrea

115. In its resolution 2182 (2014), the Security Council welcomed the meetings between the representatives of the Government and the Monitoring Group. The Council also underlined its expectation that cooperation would be deepened, including through visits to Eritrea during the current mandate. Given the lack of progress on engagement as described in the resolution, and the lack of substantive information provided by the Government, the Group recommends that the Council provide specific guidance on the modalities to deepen and advance the engagement process.

Violations of the general and complete arms embargo

116. In the light of the two-way arms embargo on Eritrea as outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1907 (2009), the Monitoring Group recommends that Member States engaged in military operations involving Eritrean land, territorial waters, airspace and security forces and institutions seek the Committee’s guidance on compliance with the resolution.

Financing in support of violations of resolution 1907 (2009)

117. In paragraph 13 (k) of resolution 2060 (2012), the Security Council mandated the Monitoring Group to assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region could be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the Somalia and Eritrea arms embargoes. Given the opaque public financial management system in Eritrea, and the concerns about resources that could be used to destabilize the region, the Group recommends that the Council urge Member States to consider providing capacity-building assistance to the Government to increase and strengthen the transparency of the country’s public finances.
Annex 1

Correspondence between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea
Eritrea’s Response Presented During the Informal Consultation Facilitated by the Chair of the Sanctions Committee

New York, 31 March 2014

1. Eritrea thanks the Chair of the Security Council Committee, H.E. Ambassador Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño, for his active and constructive engagement in facilitating today’s informal consultation with the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG).

2. The politically motivated justifications for the imposition of sanctions in 2009 against Eritrea, i.e., support for al-Shabab in Somalia and the Eritrea-Djibouti issue has long proven to be non-existent. In its recent report the SEMG has ascertained that it “has found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al Shabaab”. Moreover, the Presidents of Eritrea and Djibouti had entrusted the Emir of Qatar to mediate in their Agreement of 6 June 2010. This Agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, the Government of Eritrea (GoE) calls for the unconditional and immediate lifting of the sanctions imposed on the people of Eritrea.

3. It must be underlined that the SEMG has twice visited Eritrea. The Group met with all relevant government officials it had requested to meet. Eritrean officials have also met six times with the SEMG outside Eritrea, the latest of which being the constructive dialogue facilitated by the previous Chair of the Committee, H.E. Ambassador Oh Joon, in Paris, Cairo and New York in 2013 and 2014.

4. In all these interactions, the GoE has presented comprehensively, in writing and orally, its perspectives and explanations concerning the unjust and illegal sanction resolutions as well as adequately responded to various baseless allegations levelled against it. With the hope of dispelling the assumptions and baseless allegation once and for all, Eritrea would like to
present its views on issues of arms embargo, 2% Reconstruction and Recovery Tax, Natural Resources and Djibouti Eritrea issue.

**Arms Embargo**

5. The arms embargo imposed on Eritrea has no justification as Eritrea has never threatened regional and international peace and security. Eritrea’s focus has been and remains hinged on tackling its myriad of economic and human developmental challenges. It harbours neither the desire, nor has the financial capacity, to funnel its limited resources towards unnecessary military expenditures.

6. However unjustified and lopsided the Security Council arms embargo is, Eritrea has not violated the arms embargo provisions.

7. The arms embargo:
   a. Violates Eritrea’s right for self-defense in accordance to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. When Ethiopia continues to occupy Eritrea’s sovereign territories, including the town of Badme, the arms embargo punishes the victim and awards the culprit. Ethiopia is on an arms spending spree and in 2014 purchased weapons worth 200 million US dollars from Ukraine alone.
   b. Will potentially create military imbalances that would encourage Ethiopia to contemplate another reckless adventure of aggression against Eritrea. Ethiopia is diligently working for regime change in Eritrea and has publicly pronounced that it will undertake military action inside Eritrea.

8. The arms embargo against Eritrea must be seen in the context of the current regional security developments in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Region. Today Somalia, Libya, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Mali, etc. are unfortunately in turmoil. Extremism and terrorism is spreading in the region and globally. Yemen, whom Eritrea shares long border on the Red Sea, including Bab el-Mandab, and which is only 30 minutes flight, is regrettably in crisis.

9. In a volatile region of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, Eritrea with 50% Christian and 50% Muslims and nine ethnic groups, remains a peaceful and harmonious country. With 1200 k.m. of coastline and more than 350 islands on the Red Sea, Eritrea is strategically located at a major international maritime route that connects Bab el-Mandab and the Suze Canal. Invariably, for the sake of regional and international peace and security, Eritrea must be supported, not restricted. Unlike some countries who are asking the UN
Security Council for military action and intervention, Eritrea’s request is clear and simple—it is asking the Security Council to lift the arms embargo so that it can effectively and efficiently fight all types of extremism and terrorism as well as protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Prevention is much better than crisis management.

2% Recovery and Reconstruction Tax (RRT)

10. The UN Security Council Resolution does not prevent Eritrea from collecting RRT from its citizens. In fact, Eritrea’s action is consistent with the African Union Summit Decision that calls for the involvement of the Diaspora community in the social, political, cultural and economic development of their countries of origin.

11. RRT is an alternative and creative way of financing development that was promulgated in 1994. Until it was misrepresented and targeted as one of the areas that will weaken the Eritrean economy, it was a program that was emulated by numerous developing countries. Eritrea’s diplomats and officials were invited to different forum to share their creative method of engaging the Diaspora in the national development of the country of origin.

12. The RRT represents a symbolic burden sharing by the Eritreans in the Diaspora with the people inside the country. In this sense, its historical, moral, humanitarian and patriotic values are more significant and profound than its material dividend. In fact, the funds collected annually are modest that should not be overstated when compared with government budget and expenditure on basic social services.

13. Make no mistake; the RRT Proclamation specifically targets only Eritrean citizens in the Diaspora, not citizens of other countries of who are of Eritrean decent. SEMG’s presentation of RRT as “extraterritorial tax” is an attempt to give a misguided impression that the RRT is imposed on foreign nationals.

14. The deliberate distorted allegations that the SEMG attempts to present as a fact that the GoE uses “extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means” to collect the RRT is utterly baseless. It is a calculated misinformation aimed at preventing the active and voluntary participation of Eritreans in the Diaspora in the social and political affairs as well as economic development of their country of origin.

15. The Eritrean government has never used “coercive methods or intimidation” to collect the 2% RRT. The RRT is implemented in a transparent way. While Eritrean tax evaders residing in the country are legally charged and
convicted for their failure to respect the taxation law, Eritreans residing abroad are not even charged or convicted. They will only face explicit administrative measures such as the “denial of a business license, land entitlement, and other services”. These measures are not and cannot be considered “extortion, coercion, or intimidation.”

16. Eritrean taxation rules and measures are in no way different from those taken by any country. For example, all citizens of the United States are taxed under the same personal tax system whether they live in the country or abroad, and no matter where and how they earned their income. If these American citizens refuse to pay or avoid doing so, the U.S. government does not only take administrative action but will take additional necessary legal actions. This cannot be called “coercion or intimidation”. In fact, the US government is contemplating not issuing a passport to individuals evading taxes. It has also become a norm for some rich European individuals to revoke their citizenship in order to avoid higher tax regimes.

17. Concerning the role of diplomatic and consular mission, Eritrean missions abroad, including the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations, as a representative of all institutions of sending state have the legal right under the Vienna Convention and an obligation towards their citizens to give the necessary information and advice on why, how and where RRT are paid. This cannot be considered “solicitation”, “coercion” or “intimidation”.

**Natural Resources**

18. The provisions of the UNSC resolution related to the mining sector are anchored on hypothetical and speculative assumptions of “potential use of revenue”. Since the SEMG has itself ascertained that it “has found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al Shabaab”, there is no justification for the SEMG to continue requesting Eritrea to provide information on this matter.

19. Even though there are 17 foreign companies that have been granted mineral exploration and development licenses, today Bisha mining plant, jointly owned by Nevsun, a Canadian Company, and Eritrean National Mining Corporation (ENAMCO), is the only plant that is in the production phase.

20. The financial proceedings of the Bisha plant are issued on a quarterly basis and are available in the public domain, including in the Nevsun website. These financial reports include the proceedings that accrue to Eritrea in the form of corporate tax, royalties and dividends for anyone to read.
21. Eritrea which is a developing country needs and uses every single penny from its revenue for the eradication of poverty. Our development partners can testify to this fact.

**Djibouti**

22. Eritrea is fully committed to the Qatari mediated comprehensive agreement signed between the Presidents of Eritrea and Djibouti on 6 June 2010. The issue of Prisoners of War is part and parcel of the seven point comprehensive Agreement. There should not be cherry-picking approach and parallel initiatives must not be allowed or created.

23. The Qatari army is deployed at the common border of Eritrea and Djibouti.

24. The relationship between Eritrea and Djibouti does not warrant the continuation of the sanctions under any pretext.

**Conclusion**

25. It has been ascertained beyond any reasonable doubt that Eritrea does not support Al-Shabab in Somalia and the relationship between Eritrea and Djibouti does not constitute a threat to regional peace and security. Combating extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region requires effective regional and international cooperation. Taking in to account Eritrea’s strategic location and its commitment for regional peace and integration, the continuation of sanctions against Eritrea are not justified by any measurement. They must be immediately and unconditionally lifted.

26. Lifting the unjust sanctions will also help Eritrea to enhance its national economic development agenda, which is guided by principle of self-reliance. It will definitely create employment and other opportunities for the youth and women. Sanctioning a developing country like Eritrea also contradicts the letter and spirit of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, "No Country Should Be Left Behind".

27. Eritrea once again reiterates the need for the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) to respect the standards for investigation as stipulated in the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997) which, inter alia, underscores the need for expert panels to rely on verified information and documents, and ensure that
their “assertions are corroborated by solid information and that their findings are substantiated by credible sources”.

28. The SEMG must refrain from dwelling on the Eritrea-Ethiopia issue, which is outside its mandate.

29. It must also “respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Eritrea” that is enshrined in the UN Charter. It must strictly adhere to its mandate, which is to monitor Eritrea’s support to al-Shabab in Somalia and the Djibouti/Eritrea issue in the context its implication for the maintenance of regional peace and security. It must also adhere to the principles of transparency, objectivity and political independence.
Annex 1.2: Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group Correspondence dated 2 April 2015

UNITED NATIONS

Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group

REFERENCE: S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.9

2 April 2015

Excellency,

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) mandated pursuant to paragraph 46 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), which is attached for ease of reference. Also attached are the letters from the Secretary-General appointing the members of the Group (S/2015/67 and S/2014/854).

In accordance with its mandate, the Monitoring Group is responsible for investigating, inter alia:

- violations of the arms embargos on Somalia and Eritrea;
- acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia;
- obstruction of humanitarian assistance to Somalia;
- Eritrean support for individuals and groups responsible for destabilization of, or violence in, the region;
- obstruction of the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009) concerning Djibouti;
- obstruction of the work or investigations of the Monitoring Group; and
- violations of the ban on the exportation and importation of charcoal from Somalia.

On behalf of the Monitoring Group, I would like to thank you for participating in the meeting held on 31 March 2015 via videoconference, under the auspices of the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) (hereafter “the Committee”), between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea, represented by you as the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations, and in the presence of the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, Security Council Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat. The videoconference followed the earlier meeting between you and the Monitoring Group in New York on 10 February 2015.

...
The purpose of this videoconference was to enable the Monitoring Group to provide advance visibility to the Government of Eritrea on the Group’s preliminary findings and an opportunity to respond to them. I would like to reiterate that the Group is committed to a fair process and transparency.

The Monitor Group would also like to thank you for the note verbale dated 1 April 2015 from your Permanent Mission to the United Nations. The Monitoring Group has reviewed its content and is of the view that it does not fully address all the substantive issues and specific questions posed to the Government of Eritrea during the videoconference. As discussed then, the Monitoring Group is currently investigating the following issues pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 15 and 16 of resolution 1907 (2009), paragraphs 3 and 10 to 14 of resolution 2023 (2011), and paragraph 5 (ii) of resolution 1862 (2009):

Arms Embargo

The Monitoring Group discussed reports that the MV Shaker I cargo ship docked at Berbera port in Somaliland in January 2015. Upon an inspection by local authorities, military hardware was discovered on board the ship. The hardware was en route from Sudan to Abu Dhabi for the annual International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) that took place from 22 to 26 February 2015. The Monitoring Group has received information that the MV Shaker I also docked at the Eritrean port of Massawa where it unloaded at least six containers. The Group would like to reiterate its request made during our videoconference to receive further information on the contents of the containers.

Armed Groups - TPDM

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of a possible violation of paragraph 15 (b) of Security Council resolution 1907 (2009) in connection with preliminary information received by the Group indicating that the Government of Eritrea might be supporting, arming and training the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM), an armed Ethiopian opposition group. The Monitoring Group requested the following information from the Government of Eritrea:

- The sources of arms that might be provided to the TPDM by the Government of Eritrea;
- More information on claims that the TPDM has evolved into a paramilitary force; and
- Information regarding the location of military camps where the TPDM is being trained.

Djibouti

The Monitoring Group requested the Government of Eritrea to make available information pertaining to Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the border clashes of 10 to 12 June 2008.

/...
Diaspora Tax

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of the “Diaspora tax” and requested the following:

- Further information on the methods utilized to collect the tax;
- A copy of the Rehabilitation and Recovery Tax Proclamation (RRT) that was enacted by the Eritrean National Assembly in 1994, including official documentation that outlines the procedures and/or regulations regarding the law’s enforcement measures; and
- Documentation showing that the revenue currently collected annually through this tax is not being diverted to activities that violate relevant Security Council resolutions.

Natural Resources

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of natural resources in order to better understand the use of revenues from natural resources and requested Eritrea to share any documentation which shows that the proceeds of mining activities are not being used to violate relevant Security Council resolutions. During the last mandate, the Government of Eritrea committed itself to providing the Monitoring Group with budgetary documents that clearly demonstrate how revenues derived from the mining sector are being used. The Monitoring Group would like to reiterate this outstanding request (as outlined in OC S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.64)

Visit to Asmara

In the overall context of the issues raised during the videoconference on 31 March 2015, the Monitoring Group discussed the possibility of a courtesy visit to Asmara. Accordingly, we look forward to continue this discussion with you and your Government.

We would be most grateful for your reply as soon as possible and no later than 17 April 2015, through the Acting Secretary of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, Ms. Snjezana Gillingham (Room DC2-2052, United Nations, New York, NY 10017: fax: +1-212-963-1300; email: gillingham@un.org).

Excellency, please allow me to offer you the assurances of my highest consideration.


Christophe Trajber
Coordinator
Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
Security Council resolution 2182 (2014)
Annex 1.3: Government of Eritrea Correspondence, dated 17 April 2015

SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 751 (1992) AND 1907 (2009) CONCERNING SOMALIA AND ERITREA

S/AC.29/2015/COMM.24
17 April 2015
ORIGINAL: English

Letter dated 17 April 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the State of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Excellency,

On 2 April 2015 I received a letter from the Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group forwarded by Ms. Snježana Gillingham, Acting Secretary of Security Council Committee requesting Eritrea’s response by 17 April to questions raised by the SEMG.

Even though I have clearly answered the questioned paused by the SEMG during the two hours videoconference that took place on 31 March 2015, under your able leadership, as well as through a written submission that I sent on 1 April 2015, once again I wish to attach Eritrea’s response for the record and ease of reference. If there is any relevant additional information, I want to assure that I remain open to share it with you and the SEMG.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration and I would be most grateful if the letter and its annex could be circulated to all the members of the United Nations Security Council Committee, established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009).

Girma Asmerom Tesfay
Ambassador/Permanent Representative
Annex 1.4: Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group Correspondence dated 25 August 2015

UNITED NATIONS

Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group

REFERENCE: S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/CC.86

Excellency,

25 August 2015

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) mandated pursuant to paragraph 46 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014).

In accordance with its mandate, the Monitoring Group is responsible for investigating, inter alia:

- violations of the arms embargos on Somalia and Eritrea;
- acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia;
- obstruction of humanitarian assistance to Somalia;
- Eritrean support for individuals and groups responsible for destabilization of, or violence in, the region;
- obstruction of the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009) concerning Djibouti;
- obstruction of the work or investigations of the Monitoring Group; and
- violations of the ban on the exportation and importation of charcoal from Somalia.

I am writing following the videoconference held on 21 August 2015 and organized under the auspices of the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (hereafter “the Committee”), between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea, represented by you as Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations, and in the presence of the Deputy Political Coordinator of Venezuela, Alfredo Toro Carnevali, representing the Chair of the Committee, as well as the Secretary of the Committee. This videoconference was the third interaction between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea during the Group’s current mandate; it followed two earlier meetings that were held, outside of Eritrea, in New York, United States, on 10 February 2015 and a videoconference on 31 March 2015.

During the videoconference on 21 August 2015, the Monitoring Group explained that it had completed its investigative phase and was currently drafting its final report on Eritrea. Prior to reaching its final conclusions and completing its report, the Group will endeavour to reflect the views of the Government of Eritrea based on their substantial value and as it relates to the Group’s mandate.

His Excellency
Mr. Girma Asmerom Tesfay
Permanent Representative of the State of Eritrea
to the United Nations
New York
The Monitoring Group described its investigations and requested additional information along the points below:

**Armed Groups**

1. **Al-Shabaab**

   The Monitoring Group informed the Government of Eritrea that it had found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab during the course of the mandate.

2. **National Security Office**

   The Monitoring Group understands that Colonel Simon Ghebredengel and Colonel Abraha Kassa oversee the country’s National Security Office (NSO), which has many functions, including overseeing and managing foreign armed groups. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

   - More information on the roles of Colonel Simon Ghebredengel, Colonel Kassa and the National Security Office (NSO) in supporting arming and training foreign regional armed groups.

3. **Unity Among Ethiopian Armed Groups**

   The Monitoring Group raised the issue of Eritrea’s attempt to unite disparate armed Ethiopian opposition groups ahead of the Ethiopian general election that took place on 24 May 2015. The Group’s current findings show that a conference bringing together a number of Ethiopian opposition groups under the auspices of the Eritrean Government was held in western Eritrea. During the meeting, the groups – which reportedly included the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement, Patriotic Front, Ginbot Sebat, and the Patriotic Front - agreed to unify politically and militarily. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

   - Clarification of the role of Eritrea in the creation and maintenance of this newly unified group.

4. **Ginbot Sebat**

   During the course of this mandate, the Group has been able to confirm that Ginbot Sebat military leader Mr. Berhanu Nega left the United States where he resides, for Eritrea. Mr. Nega has expressed his commitment to engaging in military activities against the Ethiopian Government. According to confidential information received by the Monitoring Group from a range of sources including two non-African Member States with direct knowledge of the case, Mr. Nega travelled to Asmara via Egypt where Senior Presidential Advisor Yemane Gebreab personally welcomed him on 18 July 2015. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

   - Clarification on the nature of the Government of Eritrea’s engagement with Mr. Negu.
5. **TPDM**

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of Eritrea’s continued support for the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM), in violation of paragraph 15 (b) of resolution 1907 (2009). The Group’s current findings show that the TPDM continues to be the most significant armed Ethiopian opposition group being trained, financed, and hosted inside Eritrea. In addition, findings by the Group indicate that in both May and June 2015, TPDM members, inside Eritrea, conducted roundups against Eritrean citizens who have failed to report to their national military service. The Monitoring Group has received multiple corroborating testimonials that a significant contingent of TPDM fighters is stationed in Eritrea’s western region near the Sudanese border, and in and around Massawa, and that Molga Asgedom is identified as the chairman of the TPDM. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Explanation of the nature of the relationship between Eritrea and TPDM;
- Details on the sources of arms that are in possession of the TPDM;
- Information regarding the location of military camps where the TPDM is being trained and the precise role of Molga Asgedom.

6. **Front pour la restauration de l’unité et de la démocratie (FRUD)**

The Monitoring Group has received a written communiqué from the Government of Djibouti in which it stated that Eritrea continues to arm rebels from the FRUD that it dispatches to northern Djibouti. The Government of Djibouti provided the Monitoring Group with a comprehensive list of cross border activities that took place between June 2014 and April 2015 that involved Eritrean backed Djiboutian rebels. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Details regarding the relationship of FRUD and Eritrea, including the confirmation of the presence of FRUD military elements inside Eritrea, as well as the arming, training, and supporting of these elements by Eritrea.

**Arms Embargo**

7. **MV Shaker-1**

The Group has confirmed that the cargo vessel called *MV Shaker-1* docked at the Eritrean port of Massawa on 15 January 2015, and the Group noted that the Red Sea Corporation was one of three parties with consignments on the vessel. In previous reports, the Monitoring Group has identified the Red Sea Corporation as the primary procurement vehicle for the Government of Eritrea to import a range of commodities, from basic staples to heavy machinery and illegal weaponry. In previous reports, the Monitoring Group consistently identified the Red Sea Corporation as the primary procurement vehicle for the government of Eritrea to import a range of commodities, from basic staples to heavy machinery and illegal weaponry. In its 2013 report, the Group established that the route linking East Sudan to Western Eritrea was a key route for weapons smuggling, and it showed that the manager of the Red Sea Corporation in the Eritrean town of Teseney at the time was overseeing and
facilitating arms trafficking. The Group also noted that Red Sea Corporation weapon regularly mislabelled weapon shipments in order to hide their true contents. The Group had also noted that the Red Sea Corporation’s weapons shipments were regularly mislabelled in order to conceal the actual contents (S/2014/727, pg. 13-18). And while the Group has confirmed that the first stop that the MV Shaker-1 made after departing Port Sudan was the port of Massawa, the Massawa stop is the only scheduled stop that was not recorded in an international vessel tracking database the Group has access to. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Information on the contents of the Red Sea consignment. The Group would like to note that it had previously requested further information about the MV Shaker-1 during the video teleconference on 31 March 2015.

8. Yemen

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of the on-going conflict in Yemen and the possibility that Eritrea’s involvement in the Yemeni conflict could constitute a violation of paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1907 (2009). The Group’s findings show that that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have forged a strategic military relationship with Eritrea that involves using Eritrean land, airspace, and territorial waters in order to advance the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s military campaign in Yemen. Moreover, the Group understands that the UAE has leased the Port of Assab to the UAE for a period of thirty years. The Monitoring Group understands that Saudi Arabia has already established a military presence on Eritrean soil and as part of the agreement, Eritrea was asked to allow the Hanish islands and the port of Assab to be used by the Coalition in their military campaign against the Houthis. The Group also understands that Eritrea was asked to commit itself to banning the Houthis from operating in any part of its territory. Moreover, the Monitoring Group has received information that military personnel from the Eritrean Defence Forces may be actively participating in combat operations in Yemen under the umbrella of the Arab coalition. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Comment on allegations of Eritrean military involvement in the ongoing conflict;
- Explanation of the nature of the potential compensation received by Eritrea in exchange for allowing its land, territorial waters, airspace, and possibly its military troops, to be used as part of the Arab coalition-led war effort;
- Clarification of the nature of Eritrea’s relationship with the Houthi rebel movement.

Financial issues

9. Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax (RRT)

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of the Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax (RRT) collected by Eritrean Embassies and Consulates abroad. The Group’s findings indicate that unless the RRT is paid to the Government, Eritrean nationals living abroad cannot receive clearance to carry out a number of functions such as obtaining a power of attorney. During the videoconference, you kindly agreed to provide the
Monitoring Group with a copy of the Recovery & Rehabilitation Tax Proclamation. In addition, the Monitoring Group requested from the Government of Eritrea to provide the following additional information:

- Official documentation that outlines procedures and regulations regarding the enforcement of the RRT Proclamation.

10. Natural Resources

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of natural resources in order to better understand the flow of funds. It is within this context that the Group closely monitored a court case that was filed on November 2014 against Nevsun, a Canadian company that operates the Bisha Mine in Eritrea. More specifically, the Group sought to understand and assess whether any financial flows from Nevsun via Eritrean state-owned companies, Segen, Senet, Mereb or any other such company operating in Bisha Mine, are being channelled to the country’s security and armed forces in a manner that could violate the sanctions regime on Eritrea. The Monitoring Group’s findings show that state-owned contractors and sub-contractors such as Senet, Segen and military-owned Mereb were hired by Nevsun to provide labour and are engaged in an informal pay structure. The Group understands that the pay structure operates in the following way: the contractors and sub-contractors charge a certain amount to Nevsun while paying far less for each military conscript or labourer employed at the mine. In addition, the Monitoring Group requested from the Government of Eritrea to provide the following additional information:

- Budgetary documents that will paint a picture of the revenues and expenditures of the Government of Eritrea. In this connection, the Monitoring Group would like to note that Senior Presidential Adviser Yemane Gebreab had agreed to provide the Group with these documents during the course of the last mandate;
- Detailed information on the nature of the commercial relationship between the State of Eritrea, Nevsun and the following parties: Segen, Mereb, the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), and the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ);
- A copy of the agreement(s) between the State of Eritrea, Nevsun, and the aforementioned state-owned companies;
- A copy of any agreement and/or contract, or production sharing agreement between Nevsun, and state-owned companies or companies affiliated with the EDF and the PFDJ, including other partners and/or subcontractors that participated or participate in the construction and operation of Bisha Mine;
- Detailed breakdown of all expense (salary, accommodation, alimentation or any other) accrued from hiring labor force including conscripts, explanation of how these costs are being paid out and by which party (Nevsun, Segen, Mereb, the EDF and the PFDJ);
- Detailed transactional records of financial flows between Nevsun, Segen, Mereb, and the EDF.

Djibouti related issues

11. Prisoners of War and Qatari Mediation
The Monitoring Group reiterated its request to the Government of Eritrea to provide information on the fate of the Djiboutian military personnel reported missing in action. The Group also explained that it had requested from the Government of Djibouti to provide further information about the Djiboutian and Eritrean soldiers still missing in action. In addition, the Group’s findings show that Eritrean soldiers kidnapped a Djiboutian soldier named Ahmad Abdullah Kamil, in the town of Rahita in “No Man’s Land” on 25 July 2014. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested from the Government of Eritrea to provide the following:

- Detailed information on the alleged kidnapping of a Djiboutian soldier took place in “No Man’s Land” on July 25 2014;
- Confirmation whether or not Eritrea is holding Djiboutian prisoners of war;
- A clarification of the status of the mediation process sponsored by Qatar.

**Visit to Eritrea**

The Monitoring Group is committed to the process of dialogue and exchange of information with the Government of Eritrea and reiterated its readiness during the meeting on 21 August 2015 to travel to Asmara. Accordingly, we look forward to continuing this discussion.

We would be most grateful for your reply to the Monitoring Group as soon as possible and no later than 4 September 2015 through the Secretary of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, Ms. Snježana Gillingham (Room DC2-2016, United Nations, New York, NY 10017; fax +t-212-963-1300; e-mail: gillingham@un.org [and] sc-committee-751-1907@un.org).

Excellency, please allow me to offer you the assurances of my highest consideration.

/s/Christophe Trajber
Coordinator
Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
Security Council resolution 2182 (2014)
ERITREA’S RESPONSE TO QUERIES PRESENTED
BY THE SOMALIA ERITREA MONITORING GROUP (SEMG)

4 September 2015

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Eritrea commends the Chair of the Security Council Committee, H.E. Ambassador Rafael Darío Ramirez Carreño, for his effort to enhance a constructive dialogue and transparency in the work of the Committee as well as for facilitating the interaction with the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group. Eritrea also appreciates the role of the United Nations Secretariat.

2. Eritrea has on several occasions clearly and comprehensively responded, in writing and orally, to all questions and allegations of the SEMG. Unfortunately, Eritrea finds it inexplicable for SEMG to continuously ask the same questions that have been unambiguously addressed.

3. It must be underlined that in the spirit of engagement and cooperation, in the past the SEMG had visited Eritrea two times; met twice with the Political Adviser to the President, Mr. Yemane Gebreab, in Paris and Cairo; and in 2015 held three video conferences with the Permanent Representative of Eritrea, Ambassador Grima Asmerom. Several formal and informal meetings have also taken place between the SEMG and the Eritrean Mission in New York.

4. With the hope that the SEMG will not ask the same question in the future, the Eritrean Government will once again respond to the questions raised by the SEMG in its letter of 25 August 2015 (Reference: S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.86). However, while answering to the question raised, we ask the SEMG to:

a) concentrate on its mandate of monitoring whether Eritrea is supporting Al-Shabaab in Somalia;

b) refrain from dealing with matters that do not fall within the purview of its mandate, such as the situation in Yemen and in particular the Ethiopia - Eritrea conflict, which are agenda items for the UNSC to handle. The UNSC has full responsibility to urge Ethiopia to withdraw from sovereign Eritrea.
territory, including the town of Badme;

c) employ high standards of investigation methodology as stipulated in the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997) which, inter alia, underscores the need for expert panels to rely on verified information and documents, and ensure that their “assertions are corroborated by solid information and that their findings are substantiated by credible sources”;

d) respect for Eritrea’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence

e) fully include and reflect in the main part of the SEMG reports Eritrea's oral and written responses; and

f) in a spirit of transparency, share in advance its draft and final reports with the Eritrean government, as a concerned party.

II. SOMALIA

5. It is common knowledge to members of the United Nations Security Council, the Sanctions Committee and SEMG that the main reason for the sanctions against Eritrea were its alleged support to Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the relationship with Djibouti. In its report of 2014 (S/2014/727) and midterm report of March 2015, the SEMG stated that "it found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab". On its letter of 25 August 2015, it has also ascertained that "it had found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab during the course of the mandate." Eritrea welcomes SEMG's conclusion. As a result of this assertion and conclusion by the SEMG, Eritrea expects the Sanction Committee to recommend to the UNSC to immediately and unconditionally lift the sanctions against Eritrea.

III. DJIBOUTI

6. The case for lifting the sanctions which continue to be maintained six years on and without any justification is bolstered by actions that the Eritrean government took way back in June 2010 when it, along with Djibouti, accepted the mediation of the State of Qatar. At that time Eritrea also redeployed its troops from the disputed territory, a fact that was confirmed by the State of Qatar in its letter to the UNSC on 6 June 2010. The mediation and redeployment were the key demands of the UNSC, both of which were fulfilled by the Eritrean Government, and which along with the affirmation of the absence of Eritrean wrongdoing should have led to the lifting of sanctions. But better late than never. It should be lifted immediately and unconditionally.
7. The SEMG raises the issue of developments in the Qatari mediation. This is an issue that should be addressed to the Government of Qatar not to Eritrea. Similarly, the issue of prisoners of war is the responsibility that both parties gave to the Government of Qatar. In the already mentioned letter of 6 June 2010, the Prime Minister of Qatar apprised the Security Council that “the issues of the POWs and the missing persons will also be settled under the supervision of the State of Qatar,” as stipulated in Article (3) of the Agreement Between the Presidents of Eritrea and Djibouti.

8. In keeping with its practice of raising issues outside its mandate and mostly irrelevant information collected from dubious sources that have axes to grind against Eritrea, the SEMG asks about the alleged "kidnapping" of a Djiboutian soldier in the town of Rahaita in “No Man’s Land.” Aside from its pettiness and total irrelevance to the Eritrea-Djibouti issue, the SEMG is wrong on several counts. There was no “kidnapping” of a Djiboutian soldier by Eritrea. Rahaita is in Eritrea. Calling indisputably sovereign Eritrean territory “No Man’s Land” is unacceptable.

9. Over the past six years, Djibouti has made it absolutely clear that it feels it is the beneficiary of the status quo in the Horn of Africa and consequently does not want a resolution of any differences with Eritrea, favouring instead to stoke tension between the two countries, including through futile efforts to subvert Eritrea.

10. But this is beside the point. The pertinent fact is that on Somalia and Djibouti, which were the main and adjunct reasons for the sanctions respectively, there is no justification to maintain the sanctions on Eritrea. They should be lifted immediately and unconditionally. There is no Eritrean involvement in Somalia and the Djibouti Eritrea issue is being handled by the Government of Qatar.

IV. ARMS EMBARGO

11. Eritrea has consistently stated as a nation whose territory is occupied by Ethiopia and is subjected to the threat of force its rights to self-defense should be respected as enshrined in article 51 of the UN Charter. Yet, Eritrea the victim is punished while Ethiopia the culprit is rewarded. Nonetheless, Eritrea has not violated any of the provisions of the arms embargo. The mention of MV Shaker-1 or any other ship docking at the Eritrean port of Massawa does not justify or constitute violation of the arms embargo. Especially when by its own admission the SEMG has stated that "the docking of the ship in Massawa port is not recorded in an international vessel tracking data base, the Group has access to"; and when it has also admitted that it has no information on the contents of the third container.

V. CONFLICT BETWEEN ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA

12. Despite repeated entreaties from the Government of Eritrea, the SEMG, again overstepping its mandate, has sought to involve itself into the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and,
moreover, doing so in a manner that totally ignores and disregards context, perspective and ramifications.

13. Once again Eritrea underlines that the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an issue between occupier and occupied. It is the full responsibility of the Security Council. **It is not within the purview of the SEMG mandate.**

14. Ethiopia continues to occupy militarily and illegally large slices of sovereign Eritrean territory, again in violation of international law and its treaty obligation. Thousands of Eritrean families have been displaced from these occupied areas, having lost their farms, businesses and possessions.

15. For the past 13 years Eritrea has been calling on the international community, including the UN Security Council, to shoulder its responsibility and call on Ethiopia to respect its treaty obligation, the **Final and Binding of 2002 Delimitation and 2007 Demarcation Decisions of the Eritrean Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC).**

16. The United Nations, which along with the United States, the European Union and the African Union witnessed and guaranteed the Algiers Agreement that led to the final and binding boundary decision between Ethiopia and Eritrea, continues to shirk their responsibility, thereby encouraging Ethiopia in its violation of international law and Eritrean sovereignty and territorial integrity.

17. Moreover, it is known to everybody and can be verified easily that Ethiopia continues to establish, arm, train, finance, deploy and command armed mercenary groups to destabilize Eritrea.

18. Furthermore, Ethiopia officials continue to threaten Eritrea. Most recently, the Ethiopian Prime Minister speaking to his Parliament on 7 July 2015 said, "**Ethiopia will be forced to take an appropriate action against Eritrea**". The use or threat of force against any country big or small is a violation of the United Nations Charter and international law that should be condemned. The Security Council must not tolerate Ethiopia’s war threat and the occupation of sovereign Eritrean territory.

19. Eritrea has repeatedly, but to no avail, reminded the SEMG that it cannot ignore the reality and salient facts elaborated above and direct spurious charges, often based on tips from Ethiopian intelligence and military sources, against Eritrea. Dealing with the Eritrea Ethiopia conflict, context and perspective must be properly applied.

19. For the sake of peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the security of the region, Ethiopia must be urged to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Eritrean sovereign territory, including the town of Badme.
VI. Yemen

20. The SEMG again steps out of its mandate to take up the issue of Yemen and includes in its report an amalgam of outright falsehoods, errors, inaccuracies and insinuations. We only mention it here because it is an additional example of the SEMG exceeding its mandate.

VII. Financial Issues

21. Concerning the financial issue, unlike what some quarters try to insinuate, the resolutions do not restrict the Eritrean government from collecting the 2% Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax (RRT) from its citizens residing outside the country and does not also restrict the revenues it collects from the mining sector to be utilized for the development of the country.

22. It must be underlined that the provisions related to revenues from 2% Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Tax and the Mining Resources in Security Council Resolution 2023 (2011) are meant to look into the “potential use of revenue” for the destabilization of the region. To this date the SEMG has not found any evidence of any Eritrean transgression in this regard.

23. Once again since the SEMG has unequivocally confirmed that “it had found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al Shabaab”. There is no justification for the group to pursue this issue which is based on hypothetical assumptions. However, for the record, Eritrea wishes to provide the following facts concerning the utilization of revenues from the 2% RRT and the mining sector:-

a) Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax (RRT)

- all over the world, taxation is a legal obligation that must be respected and tax evasion is a criminal act that is not tolerated;
- Eritreans residing inside the country are obliged by law to pay taxes. Eritreans residing outside as well are obliged by law to pay taxes on the basis of Proclamations No 17/1991 and 67/1995. (see annex 1 & 2).
- in Eritrea, like in all countries, not paying the RRT has administrative consequences. But, they are not criminal measures that send someone to prison. The actions taken are denial of a business license, land entitlement, and other services against those Eritreans who fail to meet their legally required tax obligations. These enforcement measures are not and cannot be implemented “extraterritorially” and cannot be considered “extortion, coercion, intimidation etc. Nobody is detained for not paying the RRT and no Eritrean citizen with Eritrean ID or passport is denied from visiting Eritrea.
- the purpose of RRT is symbolic burden sharing by the Eritrean citizens in Diaspora on the nation building activity of their country and an alternative source of financing for development. It is also consistent with the African Union Summit Decision that calls for
the involvement of the African Diaspora in the social, political, cultural and economic development of their countries of origin

- the 2% RRT is collected in a transparent manner, through Eritrean consular and diplomatic offices inside and outside Eritrea. It is not collected "discreetly" or "under coercion or intimidation" as some quarters continue to insinuate.

- In accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Missions, officers, regularly inform Eritreans residing abroad on their rights and obligations as well as the procedure on how and where the payments could be done. This is done openly and publicly through town hall meetings, seminars, workshops and online media outlets. The forms are posted in the mission's website for anybody to read and print. Moreover, those who fulfilled their obligations are given an official receipt as proof of payment on the spot.

- All the revenues from the 2% RRT is transferred to the Department of Treasury of the Ministry of Finance;

- The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, in cooperation which has branch offices all over the country, with all relevant government institutions and grass roots civil society organizations, is responsible for identifying those who meet the requirements for assistance. This file is regularly updated;

- The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare allocates a monthly payment of 600.00 Nakfa for families of martyrs that is payable for a lifetime to the parents while limited until the age of 18 years for minor dependents and siblings of the martyrs. All war disabled fighters that could not be fully rehabilitated with employable skills are also beneficiaries of the monthly assistance. The disbursements are public information and are regularly reported and broadcast in the national media outlets and posted at different websites. (annexes 2, 3 & 4);

- The historical, moral, humanitarian and patriotic contents and values of 2% RRT is more significant and profound than its material dividend. The annual proceeds are modest and should not be overstated when compared with government budgets and expenditures allocated to the families of the martyrs and war disabled veterans. For instance in 2014, the annual revenue from 2% RRT was $11,172,758.33 UN dollars while what the government spent to support families of martyrs and war disabled veterans is over $27,000,000.00 US dollars. Therefore, the potential or probability of diverting RRT revenue to other activities is zero.

b) Revenue from the Mining Sector

24. The same goes for the revenue from the mining sector wherein the SEMG continues to disregard its mandate by delving into the practices of investors companies. Even though there are 17 foreign companies that have been granted mineral exploration and development licenses, it is
only one plant that is at production phase. In fact, Eritrea started exporting its mineral resources at more or less the same period as when Resolution 2023 (2011) was adopted.

25. The financial proceedings of the Bisha mining plant are issued on a quarterly basis and are available in the public domain, including in the Nevsun website. These financial reports include the proceedings that accrue to Eritrea in the form of corporate tax, royalties and dividends for anyone to read.

26. The revenue Eritrea gets from Bisha is around 200 million US dollars annually. And this is prior to its debt servicing requirements for loans incurred for purchase of 30% equity from the company as well as substantial pro rata payments for the initial capital expenditures for the establishment of the plant prior to production.

27. The income the Eritrean Government gets from a single Bisha mining operation is insignificant when compared to compared to the public and social expenditures such as education, health and food security. For example, in 2014, the Government of Eritrea's budget for education, health and food security alone was \$328,894,753.00 US Dollars which is more than the 200 million dollars the country earned from the mining sector. Therefore, the potential and possibility of diverting resource to cover other activities is nonexistent.

VIII. CONCLUSION

28. Once again, as unequivocally confirmed by the SEMG, "there is no evidence that Eritrea is financially and militarily supporting Al-Shabaab in Somalia". There is also UN Security Council endorsed mediation activity by the Emir of Qatar to solve the issue between Eritrea and Djibouti, a process to which Eritrea remains committed. In this regard, the continuation of sanctions against Eritrea is not only unjustified but unwarranted. It must be unconditionally and immediately lifted.

29. Moreover, in line with the post-2015 Development Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) that advocates that "no country or people should be left behind", sanctions definitely have negative implication on the social and economic development of the Eritrean people, in particular on the issue of poverty eradication agenda. It must be lifted immediately and unconditionally.

30. Eritrea with 1,200 kilometers of coastline and more than 350 islands with 50% Christian and 50% Moslem population is an oasis of peace in the volatile Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Region. In light of the crisis in Yemen and the spread of global terrorism and extremism, Eritrea's capability to protect its security and territorial integrity should not be undermined or weakened. The unjust sanctions must be lifted unconditionally and immediately.
1. እር እርሬ

2. እር እር

3. እር እር
1. .Executive Summary

2.  Methodology

3.  Results

4.  Conclusion

5.  References
${\text{pellier}} \times 80,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 640,000\times 17\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% \times 9\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 90,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 500,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 500,000 \times 11\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 60,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 600,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 600,000 \times 13\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 78,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 700,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 700,000 \times 15\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 105,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 800,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 800,000 \times 17\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 1,360,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 900,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 900,000 \times 19\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 1,710,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 1,000,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 1,000,000 \times 2% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 20,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 1,300,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 1,300,000 \times 6% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 78,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 1,710,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 1,710,000 \times 17% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 292,000$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 202,000 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 202,000 \times 15\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 30,300$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 30,300 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 30,300 \times 2\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 606$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 606 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 606 \times 9\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 54.54$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 54.54 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 54.54 \times 17\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = 9.26$

/ ይልል ከ ከ ${\text{ac}} 9.26 = \text{${\text{ac}}$} 9.26 \times 19\% \times \text{${\text{ac}}$} 100\% = 1.76$
22. ወ

23. ወ

24. ወ
الجريئة الإدارية الرسمية
تصدرها الحكومة الإرترية

الجلة القادمة العدد (1) إصدار 2019/2019، السنة تسعين

الرسوم التشريعي رقم/77/لعام 1998
الخاص
بضريبة الدخل الرتبة على الإرتباط الفئيبيين

أرئك: 된60/1998

اليوم: لدعم الإرتباط المالي للإرتباط الفئيبيين

كلمة الإرتباط المالي
المرسوم التشريعي رقم/27/لعام 1995م

المادة 1 — توقيت —


المادة 2 — دفع الضريبة —

كل مواطن إرتري مقيم بالخارج يتحمل على دخل سواء من الوظيفة أو أجر أو موالى أو غير موالى أو مزايا أو الراتب أو المكافآت أو أي مقدار منة أو خدمة أو نشاط، يجب عليه دفع ضريبة دخل بنسبة (2%) من مجموع دخله وذلك وفقًا لقانون الضريبة المذكور.

المادة 3 — جلب الضريبة —

تتولى وزارة الشؤون الخارجية —الإرترية— مسؤولية متابعة وقبض ضريبة الدخل الدخلية وبوجه الخدمة وفقًا لقانون الضريبة المذكور.

المادة 4 — نفايات هذا المرسوم —


الحكومة الإرترية
Ministry disburses over 3.5 billion Nakfa to Martyrs families

Asmara, 17 June 2015 – The Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare disclosed that over N$ 3.5 billion has been disbursed to Martyrs families in the past 10 years on the basis of a monthly benefit scheme.

Mr. Zerai Tekleab, in charge of follow up of the welfare of Martyrs families, said that the Government devised the monthly benefit scheme in January 2004. Citizens including members of the Defense Force and the community in general are also backing up such endeavors with various activities.
Families of martyrs in Aqordet rehabilitated

As part of the ongoing process, the residents of Aqordet sub-zone rehabilitated 16 families of fallen heroes. Each family of the fallen heroes received 10 thousand Nakfa.

Sheik Jons Zaid, Chairman of the Committee for Rehabilitating families of Martyrs, said that the assistance provided for the families of the fallen heroes is part of the high respect the society is giving to its martyrs.
Eritrea - Ministry of Information
Asmara - Eritrea

Financial support to families of martyrs

Massawa, 13 July 2015 – Wealthy citizens in Massawa have donated over five hundred thousand Nakfa in support of 43 families of fallen heroes. Each beneficiary family received twelve thousand Nakfa.

These continuous gestures of benevolence attest to a deeply entrenched culture of solidarity and burden-sharing among the Eritrean people.

A former freedom fighter, Mahamn Danie, for her part donated twenty-four thousand Nakfa to two families of martyrs that will be disbursed in monthly disbursements for one year.
Annex 2

Strategic location of Eritrea and the Hanish islands in relation to Yemen
Bab al-Mandab strait separates the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa and links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean
Annex 3

MV Shaker 1
Annex 3.1: MIC – Bills of Lading detailing Sudanese Weaponry on Board

3/3/2015

Shipment:
Military Industry Corporation (MIC) – Sudan (Kassala Street, Kaddel, Khartoum)

Bill of Lading:

Agent:

Notify Address:

Vessel:
Port of Loading: PORT SUDAN

Marine Bill of Lading

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Marks and Nos</th>
<th>Description of Cargo</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Weight (kgs)</th>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>13061</td>
<td>3050045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13062</td>
<td>2043404</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>EA100240</td>
<td>500002404</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>13064</td>
<td>1000505</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13066</td>
<td>1000505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Particulars furnished by the Merchant:

Received for shipment in apparent good order and condition, weight measured, marks numbers, quality, condition and various as shown. For carriage to the port of discharge or to any other point, to be unpacked and condition of the goods or equipment as shown at the specified Port or Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of the Consignee or their Agents, they shall be subject to the goods or equipment as shown at the delivery point of

Under collection:

Applicable only when documents Lead as a Through Bill of Lading

Date and Place of Issue: 23/10/2015

AS AGENT ONLY TO THE CARRIER
# Annex 3.2: Cargo Manifest of the Consignments Loaded at the Port of Massawa

**WADI AL-NEEL FORWARDING & SHIPPING Co. LLC**

**Date:** 01-11-2014  
**Voyage:** VISSLER  
**Port of Loading:** JEBREL AL-STA PORT  
**Captain:** ABDUL WAJHI SABRA  
**Port of Discharge:** MASSAWA PORT

<table>
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<th>Consignor</th>
<th>Notify</th>
<th>Marks &amp; No</th>
<th>Pcs</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Final Destination</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>M/V26135</td>
<td>VADAM NEEL FORWARDING &amp; SHIPPING</td>
<td>AMBASSADOR</td>
<td>SAVAN CONSIGN</td>
<td>AUB0100203 4816</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TOYOTA LAND CRUISER, STATION WAGON 2007, COLOR: WHITE, ETC. 7 PACKAGES OF CLOTH, RUGS, TENTS 1 RASHER 1 PVC COVER, FIRE 1 PC TV STAND, PACKAGES STUFFED UNDER RAMP RISK AND LIABILITY ON-consignor CONTENTS NOT VERIFIED</td>
<td>190.00</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>MASSAWA PORT</td>
<td>FREE OUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>M/V26135</td>
<td>VADAM NEEL FORWARDING &amp; SHIPPING</td>
<td>HUNTEN M预期</td>
<td>SAMA AS CONSIGNED</td>
<td>LITASABRI C0789</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SUN PUSHP MODEL 2010 COL. CURR. WHITE, ETC. PACKAGES CONSISTING OF 2 MSC SPRING 1 PC. P.B. 1 PC GRINDING 1 PC. TV WITH CURTAIN 1 PC TV STAND 4 PCS. TABLES SOLAR BATTERY 6 PANELS SOLAR CARPET 3 FOOD TRAYS STUFF 1 PC HANDER STUFF STOWED UNDER RAMP RISK AND LIABILITY ON-consignor CONTENTS NOT VERIFIED</td>
<td>1002.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>MASSAWA PORT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>M/26135</td>
<td>ALASHIRI NO. 1 COOLING INDUSTRY CORPORATION</td>
<td>SAME AS CONTAINER</td>
<td>SAME AS CONTAINER</td>
<td>EN - 14301 - SN 162 - SN 462 - SN 462 - SN 462 - SN 462 - SN 462</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AGRICULTURE, REFRIGERATION ROOM AND SPARE PARTS</td>
<td>15000.0</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>MASSAWA PORT</td>
<td>FREE OUT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3.3: Official Paperwork for the Red Sea Corporation Container Loaded in the Port of Massawa

![Bill of Lading Image]

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**Marks & No.** | **Pkg** | **Description of Goods** | **Gross Weight** | **Volume** |
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
51N - 52N - 53N - 54N | A | APPLIANCES REFRIGERATION ROOM AND STATE PARTS | | |

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**Notes:**

**Freight Details, Charges etc.:**

- FREIGHT PREPAID
- 

чен。“บริการขนส่งและจัดเก็บสินค้าเพื่อการจัดส่งทั่วทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่ในทุกที่
# BOOKING NOTE - LCL / FCL CARGO

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<th>Alasari Ind. Coolers Industry Automobile.</th>
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<td>CONSIGNEE NAME:</td>
<td>Red Sea Trading Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADDRESS:</td>
<td>Asmara - Eritrea P.O. Box: 382 Tel: 002911124388</td>
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RECEIVED BY: [Signature]
ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT
Annex 4

Government of Ethiopia Correspondence, dated 30 July 2015
SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 751 (1992) AND 1907 (2009) CONCERNING SOMALIA AND ERITREA

Letter dated 30 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Excellency,

I wish to recall the letter I sent to the President of the Council on 29 October 2014, forwarding him copy of the interview conducted by the Editor of a U.S. based Ethiopian opposition website on 22 October 2014, with the leader of Ginbot 7 - a terrorist group outlawed in Ethiopia.

In this connection, I would like to enclose herewith a news report released on 19 July 2015 by TesfaNews - a news website affiliated with the Eritrean government publicly announcing that the leader of Ginbot 7, Dr. Berhanu Nega, has "joined his comrades in Eritrea" to launch attacks aimed at overthrowing the Ethiopian government.

In providing support to this terrorist group, which openly professes its ill intentions against the Ethiopian government, Eritrea is indeed in a clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2023 (2011) adopted on 5 December 2011 which, among others, "Demand[ed] Eritrea to cease all direct or indirect efforts to destabilize States, including through financial, military, intelligence and non-military assistance, such as the provision of training centers, camps and other similar facilities for armed groups, passports, living expenses, or travel facilitation".

15-16010
This latest development is yet again another demonstration that Eritrea is neither ready nor willing to desist from destabilizing Ethiopia and the region at large. It’s continuous provocation against Ethiopia and countries of the region will have serious ramifications for peace and security. That is why I believe your committee should consider this issue as a matter of utmost concern.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Signature]

Teckeda Alemu
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Enc.

H.E. Mr. Rafael Dario Ramirez Carreno
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) on Somalia and Eritrea
New York
DR. BERHANU NEGA JOINS HIS COMRADES IN ERITREA

July 19, 2015

Welcoming ceremony for Dr. Berhanu Nega (Chairman), Ato Neamin Zeleqe (former CEO of ESAT) and the rest of the leaderships at the Arbegnoch Ginbot 7 (AGUDM) headquarters in Asmara. This is a turning point to the struggle for freedom. The countdown has now officially started.

By Patriotic Ginbot7,

AS YOU have already learnt, our struggle against the minority TPLF-led regime in Ethiopia has reached a crucial milestone at which our comrades have begun paying the ultimate sacrifice.

Armed struggle has never been our primary choice of the struggle. However, after closing all avenues of peaceful resistance, the regime has left us with the
only options of either to remain enslaved losing all our civil liberties and freedom on our home land or to fight back and regain our democratic rights.

Today, Chairman of our struggle and one time democratically elected mayor of the capital Addis Ababa, Dr. Berhanu Nega, has finally joined his comrades in arms on the ground so as to lead the struggle of freeing the Ethiopian people from the clutches of the TPLF apartheid regime.

As we have confidence in the victory of good over evil, we have no doubt that Dr. Berhanu Nega and other leaders of our organization will effectively lead our struggle to freedom, justice and democracy!

Source:  http://www.tesfanews.net/dr-berhanu-nega-joined-his-comrades-in-eritrea/
Annex 5

Sample of two percent tax Receipts with Defence contribution, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>2% Clearance</th>
<th>Military Fund</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>1995</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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**Notes:**

1. The figures are in ERN.
2. The Military Fund is a special account for defense-related expenses.

[Signature]

[Stamp]
Annex 6

Correspondence received by the Monitoring Group from the Government of Djibouti
6.1: List of Djiboutian prisoners in Eritrea as provided to the Monitoring Group by the State of Djibouti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMS</th>
<th>REGIMENT</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>DATE D'ENTREE EN SERVICE</th>
<th>MATRICULE</th>
<th>DATE DE NAISSANCE</th>
<th>N° CIN et DATE DE DELIVRANCE</th>
<th>SITUATION FAMILIALE</th>
<th>NOMBRE D'ENFANTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>KADIR SOUMBOUL ALI</td>
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<td>CAL</td>
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<td>GRADE</td>
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<td>MATRICULE</td>
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<td>N° CIN et DATE DE DELIVRANCE</td>
<td>SITUATION FAMILIALE</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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Annex 6.2: List of Eritreans currently in custody in Djibouti as provided to the Monitoring Group by the State of Djibouti

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